Forfeiture of the right to file the original written statement does not bar answering substantive amendments to the plaint.

The plaintiff filed a suit against her brother concerning property bearing No. 71, Mayfair Apartment, New Delhi, claiming that although the property stood in the defendant’s name, it had been acquired for the benefit of the plaintiff and her parents and subsequently constituted property of the Draupadi Dream Trust.

The defendant filed his written statement on 19 September 2022, accompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay; that application remained pending and was never dismissed, nor was the written statement taken off the record.

The plaintiff later obtained leave to amend the plaint. The amendment impleaded the Draupadi Dream Trust as plaintiff no. 2 and introduced a substantive prayer seeking a declaration that the Trust was the absolute and sole owner of the suit property.

The defendant thereafter filed an amended written statement with an application seeking condonation of an eight-day delay. By order dated 29 January 2026, the Joint Registrar condoned the delay, directed that the amended written statement be taken on record, closed the plaintiff’s right to file a rejoinder in another interlocutory application, and disposed of the defendant’s earlier condonation application as infructuous.

The plaintiff filed the present Chamber Appeal on 11 August 2026, beyond the fifteen-day period prescribed under Chapter II Rule 5 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, and sought condonation of a delay computed by her at 179 days.

She also challenged the amended written statement separately under Order VI Rule 16 CPC, contending that it travelled beyond the scope of the plaint amendment; that application remained pending.

Whether the delay in filing the Chamber Appeal under Chapter II Rule 5 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 ought to be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

Whether the Joint Registrar had jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the amended written statement and to take it on record?

Whether the defendant was entitled to file a written statement in response to the amended plaint, particularly after the impleadment of a new plaintiff and introduction of a substantive declaratory relief?

Whether the alleged forfeiture or invalidity of the original written statement prevented the defendant from responding to matters newly introduced by amendment?

Chapter II Rule 5 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules permits an appeal against an order of the Registrar within fifteen days; since it contains no express outer bar, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not excluded, but condonation requires “sufficient cause”.

Under Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector, sufficient cause requires diligence and a satisfactory explanation, and inordinate delay, negligence, or inactivity may justify refusal even where some explanation is offered.

Chapter VII Rule 4 of the DHC OS Rules permits extension of time for filing a written statement by up to ninety days beyond the initial thirty days, but not thereafter, and authorises the Registrar to close the defendant’s right where the written statement is not filed within the extended period.

The mandatory nature of this limit in Original Side proceedings was recognised in Ram Sarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani and Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd. v. Col. Ashish Khanna.

However, Oku Tech Pvt. Ltd. v. Sangeet Agarwal, concerning the stricter statutory regime applicable to commercial disputes, was distinguished in light of Desh Raj v. Balkishan.

Under Gurdial Singh v. Raj Kumar Aneja, when a pleading is amended, the opposite party must ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to make a consequential response, though such response must remain confined to the amendment.

A subsequent judgment or change in legal understanding does not ordinarily furnish sufficient cause for condoning an already-expired limitation period, as explained in Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal.

The Court held that the plaintiff had not explained the critical period between the expiry of limitation on 13 February 2026 and the filing of the appeal on 11 August 2026.

Her later application under Order VI Rule 16 was an independent proceeding and did not prevent her from filing a Chamber Appeal within time; similarly, the pendency of her Order VIII Rule 10 application did not disable her from challenging the Registrar’s order.

Reliance on Shiva Buildtech was also rejected because the legal position concerning the applicable limitation for written statements had already been settled before the impugned order, the plaintiff had herself raised the 120-day objection in 2022, and she still waited nearly four months after that decision before filing the appeal.

On merits, the Court found that the Registrar acted within jurisdiction under Chapter II Rule 3 and Chapter VII Rule 4.

The defendant’s original written statement had been filed and recorded, had never been directed to be removed, and had been treated as existing by the Court in the earlier amendment judgment.

More importantly, the amendment was substantive: it introduced a new plaintiff and a declaration of the Trust’s absolute ownership. Natural justice therefore required that the defendant be permitted to answer the case newly introduced by the amended plaint.

The Court clarified that this did not automatically validate every part of the amended written statement; the plaintiff’s objection that the pleading exceeded the scope of the amendment remained pending before the Joint Registrar.

Even assuming that the defendant had forfeited the right to file a written statement to the original plaint, that forfeiture could not extend to matters introduced only through the subsequent amendment. Allowing a confined response to the amended portion would not revive the lost right but would provide an opportunity to meet a new case.

Consequently, the Chamber Appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation.

The Court further held, in the alternative, that the appeal failed on merits: the Joint Registrar had jurisdiction to deal with the defendant’s delayed amended written statement, and the defendant was entitled to respond to the substantive amendments introducing the Trust as a plaintiff and seeking a declaration of its ownership.

The Court expressly left open the plaintiff’s pending objection that the amended written statement travelled beyond the permitted amendments, and made no determination on the merits of that objection or the underlying suit.