Fresh notice is mandatory after substantive amendment of plaint, even for defendants proceeded against ex-parte.

The plaintiffs (respondents 1-2) entered into an agreement to sell with the original owners (defendants 1-3) on April 10, 2006, for a property in Indore.

A suit for specific performance was filed in 2008.

During the suit's pendency, the appellants purchased the property via a registered sale deed in 2010 and subsequently migrated to the USA in 2011.

In 2023, the High Court directed the impleadment of the appellants as defendants 4-5.

Service was purportedly effected on the appellants' father in India, which the Trial Court treated as valid service.

When the appellants' counsel failed to file a Vakalatnama after appearing on a memo, the court proceeded ex-parte.

Thereafter, the plaintiffs amended the plaint to seek a substantive relief: declaring the appellants’ sale deed null and void. No fresh notice of this amendment was issued to the ex-parte appellants.

The Trial Court eventually decreed the suit ex-parte on January 29, 2024.

1. Whether the Trial Court properly proceeded ex-parte against the appellants by serving notice on their father while they resided in the USA.

2. Whether the Trial Court was required to issue fresh notices to the ex-parte defendants after the plaintiffs carried out substantive amendments to the plaint.

3. Whether the appellants, as subsequent purchasers, are entitled to challenge the plaintiffs' readiness and willingness to perform the contract under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act.

Order 5 Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), which permits service on an adult family member only if they are residing with the defendant and there is no likelihood of the defendant being found within a reasonable time.

Sumitra Bai v. Shyam Lal Sen regarding the strict interpretation of "residing with" for valid service.

The principle from Mahesh Singh v. Sewaram and Ganesh Prasad Ramprasad v. Damayanti, which mandates fresh notice to ex-parte defendants if a substantive amendment—rather than a formal one—is made to the pleadings.

Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (pre-2018 amendment), and the precedent in Ram Awadh v. Achhaibar Dubey, establishing that a subsequent purchaser has the standing to challenge the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness.

The High Court found the ex-parte proceedings procedurally flawed. First, service on the father was invalid under Order 5 Rule 15 CPC because the appellants were permanently residing in the USA; thus, the father was not "residing with" them at the time of service.

Second, the Trial Court erred by not issuing fresh notices after the plaintiffs amended the plaint. The amendment was substantive, as it introduced a new relief to cancel the appellants' sale deed, thereby directly affecting their rights.

Third, on the merits of the specific performance, the Court noted that the Trial Court incorrectly applied the 2018 amendment of the Specific Relief Act retrospectively to a 2006 transaction.

The Court emphasized that Section 16(c) is a mandatory bar, and the Trial Court failed to properly evaluate the plaintiffs' readiness and willingness, a plea the appellants were legally entitled to raise despite being subsequent purchasers.

The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the ex-parte judgment and decree dated January 29, 2024. The matter was remanded to the Trial Court for fresh adjudication, with directions to allow the appellants to file a written statement and lead evidence on the issues of readiness, willingness, and their status as bonafide purchasers.