FSSAI lacks jurisdiction to regulate animal feed as it is not 'food' under the Act.

The Petitioner, a manufacturer of animal and cattle feed, challenged the validity of Note (c) appended to Regulation 2.5.2 of the Food Safety and Standards (Food Products Standards and Food Additives) Regulations, 2011, as amended in 2021.

The impugned Note (c) prohibited feeding meat or bone meal to milk and meat-producing animals and mandated that commercial feeds comply with Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) standards and carry the BIS certification mark.

Additionally, the Petitioner challenged three directions issued by the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) under Section 16(5) of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (“Act, 2006”), which enforced mandatory BIS certification for cattle feed.

The Petitioner contended that the FSSAI lacks jurisdiction to regulate animal feed, as the Act, 2006 is limited to food for human consumption.

1. Whether Note (c) of Regulation 2.5.2 and the subsequent FSSAI directions are ultra vires the FSS Act, 2006, by attempting to regulate animal feed.

2. Whether the Food Authority is competent to mandate BIS standards for cattle feed in the absence of a Central Government notification under Section 16 of the BIS Act, 2016.

3. Whether the regulation of livestock feed falls within the exclusive legislative competence of the State under Entry 15 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.

Section 3(1)(j) of the FSS Act, 2006, which defines “food” as substances intended for human consumption and explicitly excludes “animal feed”.

Section 92, which limits the Food Authority’s regulation-making power to matters consistent with the Act.

Principles from State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamurthy, establishing that subordinate legislation must conform to the parent statute.

Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. ICAI, which clarifies the “generality versus enumeration” principle.

Rule 24 of the BIS Rules, 2018, which stipulates that Indian Standards are voluntary unless made mandatory by a specific Government order or legislation.

The Court reasoned that the FSS Act’s long title and statutory definitions, particularly Section 3(1)(j), limit the FSSAI’s jurisdiction to "food for human consumption".

Since the definition of "food" expressly excludes animal feed, any attempt by the FSSAI to regulate cattle feed through Note (c) travels beyond the scope of the parent Act.

The Court rejected the FSSAI's reliance on Section 92(1) (general regulation-making power), noting that even general powers must be exercised to "carry out the provisions of the Act," which do not include animal feed.

The Court found that the FSSAI bypassed the BIS Act, 2016; under the BIS framework, standards are voluntary unless the Central Government issues a notification under Section 16 of the BIS Act.

The FSSAI could not use its own regulations to make voluntary BIS standards mandatory for a product it has no authority to regulate.

The Court noted that the FSSAI itself had previously acknowledged the need for statutory amendments to regulate feed, yet proceeded without them.

The Court quashed Note (c) appended to Regulation 2.5.2 and all three impugned FSSAI directives.

While the Court clarified that BIS standards can be made mandatory for commercial feeds, such recourse must be taken by the Central Government through the proper channels of the BIS Act, 2016, and not via the FSSAI.

No orders were made as to costs.