Further investigation was unwarranted where the probe and subsequent audits disclosed no criminal misconduct.

The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) registered FIR No. 4/2020 concerning alleged irregularities in implementing the SAUBHAGYA scheme in Doda and other districts.

After investigation, the ACB filed a closure report on 7 February 2022, finding no criminal offence established against the accused officers, while recommending departmental action for procedural lapses.

On 13 August 2024, the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Jammu rejected the closure report and directed further investigation.

In the interim, the Power Development Department’s review concluded that there was no material showing wilful wrongdoing and closed the departmental matter; the judgment also records third-party inspections and audits of the scheme’s works.

The officers challenged the Special Judge’s order under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

1. Whether the Special Judge’s order directing further investigation was, in substance, a direction for reinvestigation or an assumption of the role of the investigating agency.

2. Whether, in the circumstances—including the closure report and subsequent departmental review and inspections—the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to set aside the direction for further investigation.

Section 528 of the BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, preserves the High Court’s inherent power to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

The judgment also refers to Section 173(8) of the Code and its corresponding provision, Section 193(9) of the BNSS, concerning further investigation.

A criminal court is not bound to accept an investigating agency’s conclusion on a final report; the judgment records that the court may disagree, direct further investigation, or take cognizance.

The High Court considered State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra for the principle that inherent powers should not ordinarily interrupt criminal proceedings, subject to compelling circumstances.

It also cited Iman Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat for the proposition that the High Court’s quashing power may be exercised even after a charge-sheet is filed or trial commences.

The Court considered that the ACB’s investigation had concluded that no criminal offence was established against the petitioners, although it identified procedural lapses and recommended departmental action.

The Government’s subsequent review found no material evidence of wilful wrongdoing, and the judgment records that inspections and audits reported satisfactory execution of the works.

Against that background, the Court considered the impugned order’s language, which described agencies as criminally liable and directed collection of evidence in a specified manner, to have the apparent trappings of reinvestigation and to suggest that the Special Court had, in effect, taken cognizance.

The Court further noted that the Special Court appeared not to have been apprised of intervening developments and that the closure report had addressed the allegation of double drawals.

In these particular circumstances, it found that setting aside the order would meet the ends of justice.

The High Court set aside the Special Judge’s order dated 13 August 2024 insofar as it concerned the four petitioners and agreed with the ACB’s closure report in respect of them.

The Court clarified that its decision did not authorize release of any amounts relating to the scheme; any such release remains subject to applicable law and relevant government directions.