G.O. 321 higher-start pay depends on appointment before 1 April 2013, not selection.

The respondents were appointed as Junior Assistants by the concerned District Educational Officer through proceedings dated 25 April 2013.

They claimed the benefit of G.O.Ms.No.321, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 02 July 1998, which granted a higher starting pay at two stages above the minimum scale to Graduate Junior Assistants, Typists and Record Clerks possessing a degree qualification at the time of appointment.

The Government subsequently discontinued this benefit through G.O.Ms.No.241, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 22 July 2013, with effect from 01 April 2013.

The respondents contended that their selection had taken place before 01 April 2013 and that the delay in issuing appointment orders was administrative.

The Single Judge allowed their writ petition in W.P.No.14301 of 2020 by order dated 21 December 2024. The State challenged that order through the present intra-court appeal.

Whether the respondents’ selection before 01 April 2013, notwithstanding their appointment after that date, entitled them to the higher starting pay under G.O.Ms.No.321 dated 02 July 1998?

Whether the benefit under G.O.Ms.No.321 could be claimed when the respondents were appointed only on 25 April 2013, after the benefit had been discontinued with effect from 01 April 2013 under G.O.Ms.No.241 dated 22 July 2013?

Whether the grant of similar benefits in two other cases created a precedent or enforceable right in favour of the respondents?

The Court applied G.O.Ms.No.321, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 02 July 1998, which provided a higher starting pay at two stages above the minimum scale for Graduate Junior Assistants, Typists and Record Clerks possessing the requisite degree qualification at the time of appointment.

It further applied G.O.Ms.No.241, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 22 July 2013, which discontinued the higher-starting-pay benefit with effect from 01 April 2013, while protecting cases in which the benefit had already been granted between 01 April 2013 and the date of the order from recovery.

The governing principle applied was that mere selection does not confer a right to appointment or service benefits; the right to fixation of pay accrues only upon appointment to Government service.

The Court also held that an erroneous benefit granted in isolated cases cannot be relied upon to perpetuate the same error.

The Court held that the relevant date was the date of appointment, not the date of selection. Since the respondents were appointed only on 25 April 2013, they entered Government service after the 01 April 2013 cut-off date prescribed for discontinuing the benefit under G.O.Ms.No.241.

Their prior selection did not create a vested right because selection alone neither constituted appointment nor entitled them to fixation of pay.

The Court therefore rejected the argument that administrative delay in issuing appointment orders could preserve the benefit under G.O.Ms.No.321.

It also declined to treat the benefit granted to two other individuals as a binding precedent, observing that those cases had been considered on their special facts and that an erroneous or exceptional grant could not justify extending the benefit to others contrary to the Government’s policy decision.

The respondents, having been appointed on 25 April 2013, were not entitled to the benefit.

Accordingly, the Court set aside the Single Judge’s order dated 21 December 2024 in W.P.No.14301 of 2020, allowed the writ appeal, imposed no costs, and closed the connected miscellaneous petition.