Google’s Gmail service is not a “public function”; Delhi High Court dismisses writ seeking account restoration

Petitioner No. 1, a media company operating the ‘Janta Live News’ business and YouTube channel, used the Gmail account at issue; Petitioner No. 2 was its director.

The petitioners alleged that third parties accessed the account without authorisation on 20 July 2026, after which Google disabled it for “unusual activity.”

Petitioner No. 2 contacted Google Support, but received no response, and the petitioners also lodged a complaint with the Cyber Police Station.

They sought a writ directing Google to verify their recovery credentials and restore full access to the account, relying on the public-function doctrine and the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the 2021 Rules.

1. Whether Google’s provision of email services, and its suspension of the petitioners’ account, constituted a public function or public duty sufficient to make the writ petition maintainable under Article 226.

2. Whether the decision in XYZ v. Union of India & Ors., 2026:DHC:8440, or obligations under the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, made the petition maintainable.

Under Article 226 of the Constitution, a writ may lie against a private body where it performs a public function; the relevant inquiry concerns the nature of the function, including whether it is similar or closely related to a function performable by the State in its sovereign capacity (G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute, (2003) 4 SCC 225).

The provision of commercial email services, or the suspension of an account on security grounds, does not, without more, amount to a public function or public duty.

Statutory obligations concerning grievance redressal and intermediary compliance under the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the 2021 Rules do not automatically convert account-restriction disputes into matters amenable to writ jurisdiction.

The Court treated the account-access dispute as arising from Google’s provision of a commercial service, rather than the discharge of a State function.

The account’s importance to the petitioners’ media business, and the widespread use of Google’s services, did not change the nature of that function; email services were also available from independent providers and were not monopolised by Google.

The Court distinguished XYZ, which concerned informational privacy and the continued online availability and searchability of judicial records, from this petition, which sought restoration of an email account.

The statutory obligations relied upon by the petitioners likewise did not, by themselves, establish a public function.

It found the writ petition not maintainable and dismissed it, while leaving the petitioners at liberty to pursue appropriate legal remedies in accordance with law.