Government Cannot Claim Special Privilege for Condonation of Inordinate Delay Caused by Procedural Red Tape

The State of Madhya Pradesh filed a second appeal against a judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court on 22.12.2007

Along with the appeal, the State filed I.A. No. 5257/2014 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking to condone a delay of 2384 days

The State contended that the delay occurred due to administrative procedures, including appointing an Officer-in-Charge (OIC), seeking multiple sanctions from the Revenue and Law Departments, and internal correspondences between 2008 and 2014

The Law Department initially refused permission in 2013 due to the six-year lapse but subsequently granted sanction in August 2014

1. Whether the administrative "procedural red tape" and internal departmental correspondences constitute "sufficient cause" for condoning an inordinate delay of 2384 days

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, regarding the condonation of delay.

The Government cannot claim special privilege or "separate periods of limitation" due to bureaucratic methodology or "impersonal machinery"

The Law of Limitation binds the Government and the public equally and the practice of filing 'certificate cases'—delayed appeals filed merely to save the skin of defaulting officers—is deprecated.

The court found that the State failed to provide a plausible or acceptable explanation for the delay of over six years

The appellants were fully aware of the impugned judgment in 2007, yet failed to take timely action

The court rejected the State’s reliance on inter-departmental reminders and files being kept pending, noting that modern technology renders the excuse of "bureaucratic methodology" unacceptable

The court observed that condonation is an exception and cannot be treated as an "anticipated benefit" for government departments that fail to perform duties with diligence

Judicial time is valuable and inordinate delays without bona fide efforts should not be entertained

I.A. No. 5257/2014 was rejected, and the Second Appeal was dismissed as time-barred