Government cannot secure condonation of inordinate delay through unexplained inaction or generic COVID-19 pleas.

The State of Bihar and its education authorities filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment dated 10 May 2018 passed by the Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 5021 of 2017.

The judgment was uploaded on 3 June 2018. The appeal was filed on 15 July 2023 with an application seeking condonation of delay of 1,864 days, equivalent to 5 years, 1 month and 9 days.

The appellants attributed the delay primarily to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting lockdown.

The Court noted that no explanation was provided for the periods from 3 June 2018 to 15 March 2020 and from 1 March 2022 to 15 July 2023.

Whether the appellants had shown “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for condonation of the delay of 1,864 days in filing the appeal.

Whether the COVID-19 pandemic and the Supreme Court’s orders extending limitation justified condonation of the entire delay despite the appellants’ failure to explain the periods before and after the excluded pandemic period.

Whether the State was entitled to a more liberal or preferential standard in assessing its explanation for delay merely because it was a governmental litigant.

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which delay may be condoned only upon establishment of sufficient cause.

It held that governmental authorities are subject to the same limitation standards as private litigants and cannot claim preferential treatment on the basis of bureaucratic procedures, administrative delay or public interest.

Relying on Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654; University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745; Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Administration, (2021) 11 SCC 557; and other authorities, the Court stated that condonation is an exception, not an anticipated privilege for the State.

The Court also relied on Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, for the principles that bureaucratic lethargy is ordinarily an excuse rather than an explanation and that the State must establish bona fide conduct, vigilance and promptitude.

Under H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, (2025) 11 SCC 440, the length of delay is relevant, merits cannot substitute for an explanation of delay, and the court must first examine the bona fides of the explanation.

The Supreme Court’s COVID-related orders excluded the period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 for limitation purposes.

The Court found that the pandemic-related exclusion did not account for the entire delay.

The appellants had approximately one year and nine-and-a-half months between the uploading of the judgment and 15 March 2020, during which no explanation was offered.

Even after the excluded period ended on 28 February 2022, they took approximately one year and four-and-a-half months to file the appeal, again without explanation.

Thus, even after excluding the period covered by the Supreme Court’s limitation orders, an unexplained delay of approximately three years and two months remained.

Applying the settled rule that governmental status, bureaucratic methodology and public interest do not constitute sufficient cause by themselves, the Court held that the appellants had not demonstrated bona fide conduct, reasonable diligence or continuous vigilance.

The Court further held that the merits of the underlying appeal could not be considered to overcome the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay.

The interlocutory application for condonation of delay was dismissed, and consequently L.P.A. No. 913 of 2023 was also dismissed on the ground of limitation, without examination of the appeal on merits.