Government employee caring for child with benchmark disability cannot face routine transfer while disability certificate remains valid, Delhi High Court rules

Dr. Deepti Bhardwaj, a Chief Administrative Officer with DRDO, was transferred from SSPL, Delhi, to IRDE, Dehradun, by an order dated 27 March 2026 described as a posting/transfer in public interest.

Her child had been certified as suffering from Autism Spectrum Disorder by VIMHANS and Specific Learning Disorder by AIIMS, in each case with disability exceeding 40%; both conditions were accepted as benchmark disabilities under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPWD Act”).

Relying on the Department of Personnel and Training (“DoPT”) Office Memoranda dated 8 October 2018 and 2 February 2024, she challenged the transfer before the Central Administrative Tribunal (“Tribunal”).

The Tribunal stayed the transfer until 24 October 2028, the date on which the disability certificate was valid, and directed DRDO to adjust her in one of its Delhi laboratories.

DRDO challenged that decision under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Court applied the DoPT Office Memoranda dated 8 October 2018 and 2 February 2024, under which a Government employee caring for a dependent child with a specified disability certified as a person with benchmark disability may be exempted from routine or rotational transfer, subject to administrative or organisational constraints.

The specified disabilities expressly include specific learning disabilities and autism spectrum disorder.

The Court relied on the RPWD Act, 2016, including the statutory concepts of benchmark disability and reasonable accommodation under Section 2(y).

It further applied the principles in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1951 SCC 1088, and Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, that an administrative order must stand or fall on the reasons stated in the order and cannot be supplemented by subsequent affidavits.

The Court also relied on Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission, (2021) 5 SCC 370, Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India, (2024) 16 SCC 654, and Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 481, for an expansive application of reasonable accommodation under the RPWD Act.

The Court held that the transfer order itself described the respondent’s posting as an ordinary transfer in public interest and did not indicate that it was consequential upon her 2024 promotion.

Since the promotion had occurred more than two years earlier, and the respondent had merely been permitted to remain in Delhi temporarily after that promotion, the subsequent transfer remained subject to the DoPT protection.

The respondent’s child possessed a subsisting benchmark-disability certificate, and both ASD and SLD fell within the disabilities expressly covered by the DoPT Office Memoranda.

Although the protection was subject to organisational constraints, DRDO bore the burden of establishing them.

The transfer order cited only “public interest,” not any specific organisational necessity, and DRDO could not improve the order through assertions made in its pleadings.

In any event, DRDO’s pleadings did not establish that no suitable CAO vacancy was available in Delhi; they merely stated that the respondent’s services could be utilised at Dehradun.

Consistent with the principle of reasonable accommodation, the DoPT instructions were therefore required to receive an expansive interpretation.

The respondent’s prior application for an overseas posting did not defeat her statutory and administrative entitlement, particularly as the circumstances and facilities available abroad were not shown to negate the protection under the DoPT instructions.

It held that the DoPT Office Memoranda applied to her transfer, that the transfer was not a promotion-related posting, and that DRDO had failed to establish organisational constraints capable of overriding the exemption.

The Tribunal’s direction staying the transfer until 24 October 2028, subject to review upon issuance of a subsequent disability certificate, was upheld.

The writ petition was dismissed in limine, and the Court declined to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution.