Governmental administrative processing, without a substantiated chronology, does not constitute sufficient cause to condone delay.

The appellant challenged a 2 February 2026 order under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by an appeal under Section 37(2)(b).

It initially sought condonation of a 17-day delay, but accepted in rejoinder that this was a computational error and that the appeal, filed on 19 May 2026, was delayed by 46 days; the respondent calculated the limitation period as 60 days under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, expiring on 3 April 2026.

The appellant attributed the delay to internal administrative examination and approval requirements, including an intervening administrative transition in Bihar.

Whether the appellant established “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to condone the admitted 46-day delay in filing the Section 37(2)(b) appeal.

Whether the appellant’s general reliance on administrative approval requirements and transition, without a specific chronology or supporting material, was sufficient to explain the delay.

Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, prescribes a 60-day limitation period for the relevant commercial appeal.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act permits condonation where sufficient cause is established.

Under Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd., delay in a Section 37 commercial appeal is not incapable of condonation, but the appellant must demonstrate bona fide and diligent conduct throughout the period from the impugned order to the filing of the appeal.

Government status or administrative processing, without a specific and substantiated explanation, does not by itself establish sufficient cause.

The Court accepted that a 46-day delay was capable of condonation, but found that the appellant had not provided a contemporaneous chronology or supporting material showing how the asserted approval requirements or administrative transition prevented filing within the 60-day period.

The appellant’s status as a government undertaking and its assertion that the appeal was meritorious were insufficient on their own; without particulars, the Court could not determine whether the delay arose from circumstances preventing timely filing or merely from ordinary bureaucratic processing.

Consequently, it dismissed the appeal as time-barred and disposed of the pending applications.