Governmental delay and unsubstantiated blame on counsel do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation.

The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal’s order dated 29 January 2025 was received by the appellant-department on 13 February 2025.

The department filed an appeal under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962, on 9 January 2026, accompanied by an application to condone a stated delay of 154 days.

The department said the file was sent to earlier counsel on 26 June 2025, later marked to present counsel on 16 October 2025, and filed after further documents were obtained.

The respondent opposed condonation, arguing that no reasonable explanation had been pleaded.

Whether the department had shown sufficient cause to condone the 154-day delay in filing its appeal

Whether the delay could be excused on the grounds of administrative delay and alleged inaction or negligence by earlier counsel

An appeal may be admitted out of time only where sufficient cause for the delay is established; condonation is discretionary and cannot be granted mechanically.

The Court relied on Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563, for the rule that government departments are bound by limitation and that bureaucratic delay, administrative negligence, or inaction without a plausible explanation is insufficient.

It relied on State of Bihar v. Deo Kumar Singh, (2022) 16 SCC 483, concerning the inadmissibility of condonation based on lethargic government functioning.

It relied on Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380, and Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185, for the principle that a litigant cannot automatically shift the entire blame for delay to counsel.

It relied on Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA), (2024) 12 SCC 336, for the requirement of sufficient cause and the rule that negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides defeats a claim for condonation.

The department took more than four months after receiving the Tribunal’s order to send the file to counsel, did not identify the earlier counsel or provide an affidavit from that counsel, and did not plead that it had followed up on the appeal’s status.

Its account was also inconsistent: it said the complete file had been supplied to earlier counsel, while arguing that further documents were needed before filing.

The Court found the period between 26 June and 16 October 2025 inadequately explained and the application’s pleadings vague and unsubstantiated; blaming earlier counsel did not cure those deficiencies.

Consequently, the appeal was disposed of.