Grant of leave to defend does not preclude eviction upon adjudication of bona fide requirement.

The Petitioner-tenant challenged the judgment dated 24.04.2023 of the learned ACJ-cum-CCJ-cum-ARC, North District, Rohini Courts, Delhi, which allowed the Respondent-landlord’s eviction petition under Sections 14(1)(e) and 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”), directing eviction from two rooms, one kitchen and a common latrine situated on the ground floor of property No. 228, Sarai Pipal Thala, Adarsh Nagar, Delhi.

The landlord claimed bona fide residential requirement for herself and her family, including accommodation for her specially-abled daughter and the daughter’s caretakers; she also contended that her sons occupied the first and second floors with their respective families.

The tenant had been granted leave to defend on the issue of availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.

After evidence and cross-examination, the learned ARC found that the landlord had established bona fide requirement and that the alternative accommodation relied upon by the tenant was insufficient.

During the proceedings, the specially-abled daughter and another daughter residing in Delhi passed away; the tenant contended that the subsequent death of the specially-abled daughter extinguished the landlord’s bona fide requirement.

Whether the learned ARC could, after granting leave to defend on the issue of alternative accommodation, ultimately hold on the basis of evidence that the landlord had established bona fide requirement?

Whether the subsequent death of the specially-abled daughter extinguished the landlord’s bona fide requirement and rendered the eviction order unsustainable?

Whether the findings of the learned ARC suffered from jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity or error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act?

The Court applied Sections 14(1)(e), 25-B and 25-B(8) of the DRC Act. Section 14(1)(e) permits eviction where the premises are bona fide required by the landlord and the landlord has no other reasonably suitable accommodation; Section 25-B provides the special summary procedure, while the proviso to Section 25-B(8) confers a limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction upon the High Court.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, the Court held that revision under Section 25-B(8) is not an appellate jurisdiction and does not permit reappreciation of evidence or substitution of the High Court’s view for that of the Rent Controller.

The Court also relied on Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover on the restricted scope of revisional scrutiny.

The principles governing bona fide requirement and suitable accommodation were drawn from G.C. Kapoor v. Nanak Kumar Bhasin, Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde, Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan and Adarsh Electricals v. Dinesh Dayal, including the rule that bona fide requirement must be genuine and not a mere desire, that the landlord is generally the best judge of residential need, and that the tenant cannot dictate how the landlord should use or arrange the premises.

The Court also noted the statutory remedy under Section 19 of the DRC Act against subsequent re-letting or transfer of premises obtained through an eviction order.

The Court held that the grant of leave to defend was only a tentative, prima facie determination that the tenant’s defence raised a triable issue; it was not a final adjudication in the tenant’s favour.

After leave was granted, the ARC was required to assess the pleadings, evidence and cross-examination on merits.

On that evidence, the ARC found that the landlord’s sons occupied the first and second floors with their families, that the ground-floor accommodation was required for the landlord’s family and caretakers, and that the alternative portion relied upon by the tenant was not reasonably sufficient.

The subsequent death of the specially-abled daughter did not, by itself, defeat the eviction claim because the requirement had been assessed in the broader context of the landlord’s residential needs, the accommodation occupied by her sons and their families, and the overall family circumstances; the ARC’s finding was not based exclusively on the daughter’s continued survival.

Since the tenant’s objections essentially sought a fresh assessment of the evidence and suitability of accommodation, rather than demonstrating a jurisdictional or legal error, the limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) could not be invoked.

It held that the ARC was not bound by its earlier prima facie view granting leave to defend, and that the subsequent death of the specially-abled daughter did not automatically extinguish the landlord’s broader bona fide residential requirement.

The impugned eviction judgment was found to contain no manifest illegality, jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity or error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

Accordingly, the revision petition and pending applications were dismissed, and the matter was disposed of in those terms.