Gross negligence and unexplained delay do not warrant condonation, even on payment of costs.

The petitioners, original plaintiffs in Regular Civil Suit No. 87 of 2019, challenged the rejection of their application to condone delay in seeking restoration of the suit.

The suit had been dismissed for non-prosecution on 9 March 2020 after the plaintiffs and their advocate failed to appear despite opportunities.

They attributed their failure to act to the COVID-19 pandemic, but obtained a certified copy of the dismissal order on 28 November 2022 and filed the delay application only on 21 September 2023.

The petitioners sought relief under Article 227 of the Constitution, including setting aside the trial court’s order and directing it to decide the restoration application on its merits.

1. Whether the petitioners established sufficient cause to condone the delay in seeking restoration of the suit.

2. Whether the trial court’s refusal to condone the delay warranted interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 permits condonation of delay where sufficient cause is established, and should be applied through a liberal, justice-oriented approach; however, that discretion is not warranted where the applicant’s explanation is inadequate or the delay reflects negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides.

The Court relied on Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, K.B. Lal v. Gyanendra Pratap, Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), and Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board for these principles.

It also cited Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash on the purpose of limitation periods: to require timely assertion of rights and discourage stale claims.

Under Article 227, interference was appropriate only if the impugned order was perverse, grossly erroneous, or contrary to settled law.

Although the Court recognised that courts should not take a pedantic approach to delay, it found the petitioners had not explained their prolonged inaction.

The pandemic did not account for their failure to check the suit’s status for over two years after normal court functioning resumed; further, they waited about eleven months after obtaining the certified copy before filing the delay application.

In light of this unexplained delay and the resulting negligence, the Court held that sufficient cause was absent and that imposing costs would not justify condonation.

It found no perversity or other infirmity in the trial court’s order warranting Article 227 intervention.

The petition was dismissed in limine, with no order as to costs.