Gross, unexplained delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings justifies their quashing despite parallel criminal proceedings.

The respondent, while serving as an Assistant in the DDA’s SFS (Housing) Branch, was alleged to have facilitated forged and fabricated challans resulting in allotment of flats and financial loss to the DDA in 1997.

He was placed under suspension on 13 January 1998, and an FIR was registered on 29 January 1998.

He superannuated on 31 March 2007.

The criminal proceedings culminated in his acquittal by the Special Judge, CBI, on 7 November 2014, the prosecution having failed to prove the charges against him beyond reasonable doubt.

Thereafter, the DDA issued a charge-sheet under Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, on 1 February 2017—approximately twenty years after the alleged misconduct.

The Central Administrative Tribunal quashed the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay.

The DDA challenged that order under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Whether the disciplinary proceedings were barred by Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, on the ground that they related to an event occurring more than four years before their institution?

Whether the disciplinary proceedings were liable to be quashed on account of the inordinate and unexplained delay of approximately twenty years in issuing the charge-sheet?

Whether the Tribunal’s decision warranted interference in exercise of the High Court’s certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226?

Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 provides that, where departmental proceedings are instituted after retirement, they shall not relate to an event that occurred more than four years before such institution.

However, under Rule 9(6)(a), departmental proceedings are deemed to have been instituted on the date of issuance of the statement of charges or, where the Government servant was earlier placed under suspension, on the date of suspension.

The Court further applied the principle that disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings operate on different standards of proof, and pendency of criminal proceedings does not by itself justify indefinite delay in initiating departmental action.

Gross and unexplained delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings may render continuation of those proceedings unfair and impermissible, particularly where the employee has retired and is prejudiced in defending the charges.

In exercising certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court exercises supervisory, not appellate, jurisdiction and does not reappreciate evidence or substitute its view for that of the Tribunal; interference is justified only for jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice, or an error of law apparent on the face of the record, as explained in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477.

The Court held that Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) could not assist the respondent because, by virtue of Rule 9(6)(a), the departmental proceedings were deemed to have commenced on 13 January 1998, the date on which he was placed under suspension—well before his retirement and shortly after the alleged misconduct.

Nevertheless, the DDA’s explanation that it had awaited the outcome of the criminal case was inadequate, since the criminal and departmental proceedings apply different standards of proof and the criminal proceedings could not justify a twenty-year delay in issuing the charge-sheet.

The alleged misconduct occurred in 1997, the respondent retired in 2007, he was acquitted in 2014, and the charge-sheet was issued only in 2017.

The Court considered this delay gross, inordinate, and unexplained, and found that requiring a retired employee to defend such stale charges would be harsh and unrealistic.

Applying the limited standards of judicial review under Article 226, the Court found the Tribunal’s decision to be reasonable and free from any jurisdictional or patent legal error warranting interference.

The Tribunal’s order quashing the disciplinary proceedings was upheld, and the writ petition was dismissed under Article 226, without the Court expressing any opinion on the merits of the allegations against the respondent.