GST officers can investigate taxpayers assigned to another administration without a separate cross-empowerment notification, Madras High Court rules

A batch of 22 writ appeals—16 filed by State GST authorities and six by Central GST authorities—challenged a common order of the writ court dated 11 March 2024.

The writ court had quashed the impugned proceedings, including summons and assessments, on the ground that cross-empowerment under Section 6 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“CGST Act”) required a notification that had not been issued.

The Supreme Court subsequently decided the related cross-empowerment issues in Armour Security (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, 2025 INSC 982.

In W.A. No. 687 of 2026, the assessee’s requested relief had meanwhile been granted by an adjudication order dated 20 January 2025, which was under a pending statutory appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act.

Whether a notification under Section 6(1) of the CGST Act is a prerequisite for State or Central tax authorities to exercise cross-empowered functions.

Whether the writ court’s orders quashing the proceedings should stand, or whether the matters should be reconsidered in light of the Supreme Court’s conclusions and guidelines in Armour Security.

Section 6(1) of the CGST Act and the corresponding State GST provisions provide for cross-empowerment; as explained in the CBIC clarification dated 22 June 2020, a notification is required to impose conditions on that power, and its absence does not suspend the statutory power.

Under Section 6(2)(b), as interpreted in Armour Security (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, 2025 INSC 982, parallel proceedings are barred where they concern the same subject matter; intelligence-based enforcement may be initiated by either tax administration, but duplicate proceedings concerning an identical liability or contravention must not continue.

A summons or investigative step does not itself amount to formal initiation of proceedings; that occurs with the issuance of a show-cause notice.

The Court also relied by analogy on M/s Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 1 SCC 364, for the principle that the absence of a later law imposing conditions does not, by itself, prevent the exercise of an existing statutory power.

The writ court had treated the absence of a Section 6 notification as fatal to the authorities’ cross-empowerment.

The Division Bench held that this reasoning could not stand in light of Armour Security and the clarification considered there: the notification contemplated by Section 6(1) serves to impose conditions, and its non-issuance does not render the provision inoperative.

However, the Supreme Court’s framework requires examination of whether the matters involve overlapping proceedings on the same subject matter.

The Court therefore directed that the appeals, other than W.A. No. 687 of 2026, be remitted for disposal under Armour Security and its guidelines.

All appeals other than W.A. No. 687 of 2026 were allowed by way of remand, with the appellants granted four weeks to file counters in matters where none had been filed.

W.A. No. 687 of 2026 was closed because the assessee had obtained the relief sought and a statutory appeal against the adjudication order was pending.

No costs were ordered, and the connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.