Headline: Admission of signature triggers Section 139 NI Act presumption, requiring cogent evidence to establish misuse. Core Principle: Once the signature on a cheque is admitted, the statutory presumption of a legally enforceable debt under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act arises. To rebut this presumption, the accused must provide cogent evidence or prove a probable defense; mere allegations of cheque misuse or loss, especially without taking legal action for such misappropriation, are insufficient to discharge the evidential burden.

The respondent-complainant alleged that he lent the petitioner-accused Rs. 5,00,000 in January 2017 for the purchase of a site.

In June 2018, the petitioner issued a cheque for the said amount, which was subsequently dishonored due to "insufficient funds".

The petitioner’s defense was that she had only borrowed Rs. 1,00,000 in 2010, repaid Rs. 50,000 in cash, and issued the disputed cheque for the balance.

She claimed the complainant falsely represented that the cheque was lost, obtained a second cheque (which was encashed), and later misused the "lost" cheque by filling in Rs. 5,00,000.

The Trial Magistrate (XXII Addl. CMMS) convicted the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The First Appellate Court (LVIII Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge) confirmed the conviction in October 2025.

1. Whether the petitioner-accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

2. Whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts suffered from perversity or misunderstanding of evidence regarding the alleged misuse of the cheque.

Sections 138, 118, and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which mandate a presumption in favor of the holder that a cheque is received for the discharge of a debt or liability.

The court relied on the precedent set in Rangappa v. Mohan and Rohit Bhai Jeevanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat, affirming that once basic ingredients are met, the court must presume consideration and existing debt.

The principles from Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh (2023), which clarify that once a signature is admitted, the evidential burden shifts entirely to the accused to prove the non-existence of debt through a preponderance of probabilities.

The High Court observed that since the petitioner admitted to the issuance of the cheque and her signature, the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act was legally triggered.

The court found the petitioner's defense of "misuse" lacked credibility because she failed to initiate any criminal action or police complaint regarding the allegedly "lost" and misused cheque, despite having family members in the legal profession.

The court noted that the Trial Court had scrutinized the bank passbooks (Ex.D-1), which proved that the disputed cheque series did not match the petitioner's bank transactions for the year 2013, contradicting her version of the timeline.

Following the Rajesh Jain doctrine, the court held that the petitioner's challenge to the complainant's lending capacity was a "feeble attempt" and failed because she did not provide cogent evidence to displace the presumption of a legally recoverable debt.

The court held that the petitioner failed to establish a plausible defense to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act.

The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition and upheld the conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court.