Headline: Courts generally do not interfere with charge memos or disciplinary proceedings prematurely.

The applicant, Shri James Mathai, a Senior SSA in the office of RO, Rajkot, filed an Original Application (OA) challenging a Charge Memorandum dated January 8, 2026, issued by Respondent No. 4 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

The charge memorandum alleged that while serving as Caretaker at RO, Rajkot during 2022-23 to 2023-24, the applicant initiated proposals without mentioning proper instructions/provisions/rules in violation of GFR provisions, delegation of financial power, and Head Office instructions dated March 20, 2019, regarding procurements under various heads (Minor Work, Fixture & Furniture, Office Equipment, Computerization), thereby violating Rule 3(1) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

A second charge alleged violation of Rule 225 (xv) of GFR 2017 and CVC Circular dated November 6, 2008, by submitting proposals for extending contractor services.

The applicant submitted a detailed representation on February 5, 2026, denying the charges and requesting the Disciplinary Authority (DA) to quash the memorandum ab-initio.

The applicant's counsel argued that the charges were vague, imprecise, and did not give a clear picture for an effective defense, citing *Surath Chandra Chakravarty V/s. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 752*.

It was further contended that the applicant, being in the lowest post, was made a scapegoat, as higher authorities had approved the proposals, and pre-audit and post-audit found no irregularities.

Additionally, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated more than three years after the alleged acts, without explanation for the delay, making the proceedings vitiated.

Fearing that the DA would initiate departmental inquiry without considering his representation, the applicant approached the Tribunal.

1. Whether the Charge Memorandum dated January 8, 2026, issued to the applicant, should be quashed and set aside at an initial stage on the grounds of vagueness, delay in initiation, and premature challenge.

The Tribunal applied Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, which outlines the procedure for initiating disciplinary proceedings and is made applicable to Employees Provident Fund (Staff and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 2025.

Specifically, sub-rules 4(b), 5, and 6 of Rule 14, which pertain to the submission of a written statement of defense and the Disciplinary Authority's decision on how to proceed with the inquiry, were considered.

The Tribunal’s decision also relied on the settled legal principle that courts/Tribunals generally should not set aside charge memorandums or disciplinary proceedings in a routine manner at a premature stage unless they are issued by an incompetent authority or the charges are untenable in law.

The court distinguished the applicability of judgments concerning vague charges and delay (*Anant R. Kulkarni Vs. Y.P. Educational Society* and *M.V.Bijlani Vs. UOI & Ors.*) when the charges are specific and supported by evidence.

The Tribunal found that the charge memorandum was specific, detailing violations of particular rules (GFR, CVC directions) and providing a statement of imputation, a list of documents (RUDs), and a list of witnesses to support the alleged charges.

Therefore, the applicant's submission that the charges were vague was explicitly rejected, distinguishing the facts from the judgments relied upon by the applicant.

The Tribunal recognized that the applicant had already submitted his representation/written statement of defense to the Disciplinary Authority under Rule 14(4)(b), and the DA had not yet made a decision under sub-rules 5 and 6 of Rule 14, regarding whether to proceed with an inquiry.

The Tribunal noted that the applicant was challenging the charge memorandum at a premature stage based on an apprehension, without any adverse order being passed.

It reiterated the principle that a Writ Application does not typically lie against a charge memorandum as it does not amount to an adverse order affecting the rights of any party unless issued by an incompetent authority or outlining charges untenable in law.

In this case, there was no material to demonstrate that the charge memorandum was issued by an incompetent authority.

The Tribunal held that the charges were specific and clear, not vague, and that the disciplinary proceedings had not reached a stage where intervention was warranted.

It concluded that the applicant had approached the Tribunal prematurely, based on an apprehension, before the Disciplinary Authority had even decided on the applicant’s representation, and therefore, no cause of action had arisen.