High Court cannot direct exclusion of time spent in writ petitions for computing mandatory IBC limitation.

The Appellants, acting as Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors, challenged orders dated 27.05.2025 passed by the NCLT, Kochi Bench, which admitted them into the Insolvency Resolution Process (IRP) under Section 95 of the I Code.

Although the orders were uploaded on 28.05.2025 and certified copies were received by 01.07.2025, the Appellants did not immediately file statutory appeals.

Instead, on 06.07.2025—the 40th day post-pronouncement—they filed Writ Petitions before the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala.

On 05.11.2025, the High Court dismissed the writs due to the availability of an alternative remedy under Section 61 of the Code but directed that the 122 days spent prosecuting the writs "should be excluded" while computing the limitation period for filing appeals before the NCLAT.

The Appellants subsequently e-filed these appeals on 16.11.2025 and 17.11.2025, approximately 174 days after the original NCLT order.

1. Whether the period of 122 days spent prosecuting writ petitions before the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala can be excluded for the computation of limitation under the I Code.

2. Whether a High Court, while declining to interfere on grounds of an alternative statutory remedy, possesses the jurisdiction to direct the NCLAT to exclude the time spent before the High Court for limitation purposes.

Section 61(2) of the I Code, which mandates a 30-day limitation period for appeals, extendable by only 15 days upon showing "sufficient cause".

Asma Lateef Anr. v. Shabbir Ahmad Ors. (2024), which establishes that once a court holds a proceeding is not maintainable, it becomes functus officio and cannot pass directions providing positive benefits or overriding statutory appeal procedures.

M/s. Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2019) and Johnson Lifts Pvt. Ltd. v. Tracks Towers Infratech Pvt. Ltd. (2024), affirming that NCLT/NCLAT are special tribunals under Sections 408 and 410 of the Companies Act, and High Courts should not interfere in matters governed by the IBC where a statutory judicial review mechanism exists.

The Tribunal reasoned that the IBC is a strictly time-bound statute.

The Appellants filed their Writ Petitions on the 40th day after the NCLT order, which was already beyond the initial 30-day statutory limit provided in Section 61(2).

The Tribunal observed that the High Court’s direction to "exclude" the time spent before it was an overreach of jurisdiction; once the High Court determined that the writ was not the appropriate remedy, it lacked the authority to issue positive directions concerning the condonation of delay for a separate statutory appeal.

Furthermore, since the NCLAT is not under the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court regarding IBC proceedings, the High Court’s directives cannot override the mandatory limitation periods of a special statute.

The Tribunal emphasized that a party cannot indirectly extend limitation periods by pursuing non-maintainable remedies.

Consequently, since the appeals were filed 174 days after the pronouncement of the impugned orders—well beyond the maximum 45-day window (30+15) permitted under Section 61 of the I Code—they were barred by limitation.

The Condone Delay Applications and the Company Appeals were dismissed, and all pending interlocutory applications were closed.