High Court Cannot Substitute Punishment but May Restrict Disciplinary Authority from Re-Imposing Disproportionate Penalties on Remand

The respondent, an Assistant Engineer, was dismissed from service on 26.09.2016 following a Departmental Enquiry where 10 charges were allegedly proved.

His appeal was dismissed on grounds of limitation, and his revision was subsequently rejected.

The respondent challenged these orders via writ petitions (W.P. No. 6640/2018 & 8286/2023). On 08.10.2025, the learned Single Judge allowed the petitions, holding the charges non-specific and the punishment of dismissal "shockingly disproportionate" given that some charges (like unauthorized absence) were actually sanctioned leave.

The Single Judge remanded the matter for a fresh penalty order, excluding dismissal, removal, or 100% pension stoppage.

The employer (appellant) filed these intra-court appeals against the Single Judge’s directions.

1. Whether the Writ Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-examining the merits of the misconduct and substituting its opinion on the quantum of punishment.

2. Whether the direction to the Disciplinary Authority to pass a specific category of penalty (excluding dismissal/removal) and granting consequential benefits from the original date of 2016 was legally sustainable.

The Court applied the Wednesbury Principles and the principle of Proportionality in administrative law, as established in Om Kumar and Others v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386, which mandates that the jurisdiction of High Courts in disciplinary matters is limited to reviewing the decision-making process unless the punishment is strikingly disproportionate.

Definition of "misconduct" as per M.M. Malhotra v. Union of India (2005) 8 SCC 351, involving unlawful behavior or misfeasance.

The Division Bench reasoned that while the primary role of determining punishment lies with the Disciplinary Authority, the Writ Court is empowered to intervene if the penalty is "shockingly disproportionate" to the judicial conscience.

The Court found that the Single Judge did not technically substitute the punishment but rather set boundaries for the Disciplinary Authority after concluding that the original charges did not involve major misconduct warranting dismissal.

The Bench emphasized that the Single Judge correctly refrained from converting the penalty himself (e.g., to compulsory retirement) and instead remanded it.

Regarding the "relation back" of the new penalty to 2016, the Court held this was necessary to ensure the respondent received consequential benefits appropriate to the modified penalty, rather than leaving him in a legal vacuum.

The High Court dismissed the writ appeals and upheld the Single Judge’s order. The Disciplinary Authority remains free to decide the specific modified penalty, but any such order and its consequential benefits shall be effective from the original date of the quashed penalty, i.e., 26.09.2016. No order as to costs.