High Court jurisdiction as court of first instance in service matters is barred by *L. Chandra Kumar*.

The Petitioner, an individual with 81% permanent disability, filed a writ petition seeking multiple reliefs, including the quashing of an administrative notice and order dated 14.05.2026, and the setting aside of Paragraph 17(vi) of a Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) order dated 11.11.2025.

He further sought a mandamus for "High Support Need" status, financial benefits, promotional arrears, and ₹75,00,000 in damages for misfeasance.

Earlier, the CAT had set aside the stoppage of the Petitioner's allowances due to lack of notice but allowed the department to revisit the decision after providing such notice.

The Petitioner approached the High Court directly, claiming that a previous High Court order dated 06.04.2026 granted him the right to bypass the Tribunal and that the institutional "fraud" committed by respondents necessitated extraordinary jurisdiction.

1. Whether Paragraph 17(vi) of the CAT order dated 11.11.2025, which reserved the liberty of the employer to revisit service benefits upon notice, is legally infirm.

2. Whether the High Court can act as a court of first instance for "service matters" amenable to the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal.

3. Whether the Petitioner’s claims of fundamental right violations and "institutional fraud" exempt him from the jurisdictional mandate established by the Seven-Judge Bench in L. Chandra Kumar.

The court primarily applied the jurisdictional mandate established by the Seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, which held that Administrative Tribunals act as the "courts of first instance" for all matters amenable to their jurisdiction under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

Section 14(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which defines the jurisdiction of the CAT over "service matters".

Section 3(q) of the same Act, which defines "service matters" broadly to include all conditions of service including remuneration, pension, and "any other matter whatsoever".

Article 141 and 144 of the Constitution of India, necessitating adherence to Supreme Court precedents.

The Court first determined that Paragraph 17(vi) of the CAT order was valid because it simply reinforced the principles of natural justice by requiring the department to provide notice before revisiting emoluments.

Regarding the remaining reliefs, the Court found itself coram non judice.

It rejected the Petitioner's argument that a prior High Court order allowed him to bypass the CAT, noting the Petitioner had misquoted the court's previous direction.

The Court clarified that the rule in L. Chandra Kumar is not a matter of "alternate remedy" (discretionary) but a "bar of jurisdiction" (mandatory) for the High Court to act as a court of first instance in service disputes.

The Court further reasoned that even allegations of "institutional fraud" or the Petitioner’s impending superannuation could not override the constitutional framework that requires service disputes to be adjudicated by the Tribunal first.

It held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the primary service-related reliefs and reserved liberty for the Petitioner to approach the CAT as the court of first instance.

The Court granted liberty to file a separate contempt petition for specific prayers and offered to transmit the record to the CAT, requesting the Tribunal to register the matter and decide it within four months.

The writ petition was disposed of with a direction for parties to appear before the CAT on 20 July 2026.