### High Court Lacks Power to Condone Delay in Filing Written Statement Beyond the Mandatory 120-Day Limit Case Brief: Jyoti Subba & Anr. v. Mahesh Aggarwal & Anr. Facts: The Defendant No. 2 (Mrs. Minu Subba) was impleaded in a civil suit on July 24, 2025, and directed to file a written statement within 30 days. Under the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, the maximum permissible period for filing—including a 90-day extension based on sufficient cause—is 120 days. The Defendant filed her written statement on November 27, 2025 (a delay of 126 days), along with an application for condonation of delay citing "personal difficulties" and "economic constraints." Issue: Whether the Court has the jurisdiction to condone a delay in filing a written statement beyond the 120-day outer limit prescribed by the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. Ruling: The Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay, holding that: 1. Mandatory Deadlines: Rules 2 and 4 of Chapter VII of the DHC (OS) Rules are preemptory. The phrase "but not thereafter" signifies a terminal point that cannot be extended even by the Court’s inherent powers. 2. Primacy of High Court Rules: The DHC (OS) Rules constitute a "special law" under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, overriding the general provisions of the CPC regarding timelines for filing pleadings. 3. Binding Precedent: Following the Division Bench ruling in *Ram Sarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani*, the Court reaffirmed that the right to file a written statement stands extinguished upon the expiry of the maximum 120-day period. 4. Vague Grounds: Even if discretion existed, the reasons provided by the Defendant (personal/economic constraints) were too vague to constitute "exceptional and unavoidable" circumstances. Key Takeaway: In original side suits before the Delhi High Court, the 120-day limit for filing a written statement is an absolute boundary; any delay beyond this period is legally non-condonable.

The Plaintiff filed a civil suit against the Defendants.

On 24.07.2025, the Court impleaded Mrs. Minu Subba as Defendant No. 2 and directed her to file a written statement within 30 days.

Calculating from the terminus a quo of 24.07.2025, the deadline was 23.08.2025, with the maximum permissible 120-day limit (including condonable delay) expiring on 21.11.2025.

The Defendant No. 2 filed her written statement on 27.11.2025—a delay of 126 days—attributing the lapse to personal difficulties, economic constraints, and the time required for newly engaged counsel to study the case.

Consequently, I.A. 31400/2025 was filed seeking condonation of the said delay.

Whether the Court possesses the power to condone a delay in filing a written statement beyond the maximum period of 120 days prescribed under the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018.

Whether the reasons provided by the Defendant (economic constraints and change of counsel) constitute "exceptional and unavoidable" circumstances warranting condonation within the discretionary period.

The Court primarily applied Chapter VII, Rules 2 and 4 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 (“DHC OS Rules”), which stipulate a 30-day period for filing a written statement, extendable by 90 days upon showing sufficient cause, but "not thereafter".

It relied on the Division Bench precedent in Ram Sarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani (2020), which established that the phrase "but not thereafter" indicates a mandatory, peremptory deadline that extinguishes the right to file the pleading once the outer limit (120 days for written statements) expires.

The Court further applied the principles from Ms. Charu Agarwal v. Mr. Alok Kalia & Ors. (2023), affirming that the DHC OS Rules, being special law, override the general provisions of the CPC and exclude Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The Court observed that the written statement was filed on the 126th day, which is six days beyond the non-extendable 120-day boundary established by the DHC OS Rules.

The Court rejected the applicant's plea for a "liberal construction," noting that the phrase "but not thereafter" in Rule 4 leaves the Court "powerless" to grant extensions beyond the statutory cap.

It distinguished between the directory nature of Order VIII Rule 1 CPC and the mandatory nature of the DHC OS Rules, emphasizing that the latter constitutes a "complete code".

Regarding the merits of the delay, the Court found the applicant's explanations regarding personal difficulties and change of counsel to be "vague" and insufficient to meet the threshold of "exceptional" or "unavoidable" circumstances required even for the initial 90-day extension period.

Finally, the Court dismissed the suggestion to remand the matter to the Joint Registrar, characterizing it as a "useless formality" given the settled legal position.

On the second issue, the Court held that the reasons provided were insufficient even if the delay had been within the condonable limits.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed I.A. 31400/2025 and refused to take the written statement of Defendant No. 2 on record.

The suit was listed for framing of issues on 16.04.2026.