High Courts cannot reappreciate evidence in departmental inquiries where findings rest on some evidence.

The petitioner, a Sub-Inspector posted at Police Station Hazira, was alleged to have apprehended three persons gambling near Resham Mill/Almari Karkhana on 21 October 2017, brought them to the police station, and released them without initiating legal proceedings, making a Rojnamcha entry, or informing the Station House Officer.

A complaint also alleged that money had been taken for their release, although the Enquiry Officer found no evidence substantiating the alleged monetary transaction.

The petitioner was suspended on 31 October 2017, and the suspension was revoked on 7 November 2017.

Following a preliminary enquiry, a charge-sheet was issued on 9 February 2018. A departmental enquiry was conducted, in which the petitioner participated, produced his defence, and examined witnesses.

The Enquiry Officer found the charge proved, and the Disciplinary Authority removed the petitioner from service by order dated 11 October 2019.

His statutory appeal was dismissed on 2 March 2020, and his mercy petition was rejected on 13 August 2020.

The petitioner challenged the punishment, appellate, and mercy orders under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Whether the findings of misconduct recorded by the Enquiry Officer and accepted by the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities were based on no evidence or were otherwise perverse, arbitrary, or legally unsustainable.

Whether the departmental enquiry violated the principles of natural justice or any statutory procedure, including by relying on particular witnesses and allegedly failing to examine another relevant witness.

Whether the punishment of removal from service was disproportionate to the proved misconduct and warranted interference under Article 226.

The Court applied the settled limits of judicial review under Article 226: a constitutional court does not act as an appellate authority or reappreciate evidence in departmental proceedings.

Relying principally on State of Karnataka v. N. Gangraj, State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, the Court held that interference is permissible only where the enquiry is conducted by an incompetent authority, violates natural justice or statutory rules, is based on no evidence, or produces a conclusion that no reasonable person could reach.

High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, and State Bank of India v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde were applied to reiterate that adequacy, reliability, and sufficiency of evidence cannot ordinarily be examined in writ jurisdiction.

Departmental proceedings require proof on the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the Evidence Act’s strict rules do not apply.

The proportionality of punishment is generally not reviewable unless the penalty is mala fide or so disproportionate that it shocks the Court’s conscience.

The Court found that the statements of Constables Patiram, Jitendra Semil, and Dharmendra Singh Gurjar consistently supported the material allegation that several persons were found gambling, that three were apprehended, and that they were released without legal proceedings, Rojnamcha entries, or intimation to the Station House Officer.

The Enquiry Officer also considered the petitioner’s defence, the presenting officer’s submissions, and CCTV footage, and concluded that the principal misconduct was proved; the absence of evidence regarding payment of money did not negate the proved misconduct of unauthorisedly releasing the persons.

The Court held that the petitioner’s objections concerning evidentiary discrepancies, the identity or duty status of witnesses, and the non-examination of another witness invited impermissible reappreciation of evidence rather than demonstrating a case of “no evidence” or procedural prejudice.

Since the petitioner had participated in the enquiry and had been afforded an opportunity to defend himself, no violation of natural justice or statutory procedure was established.

The removal penalty was also not shown to be mala fide or shockingly disproportionate, particularly in light of the disciplinary obligations attached to police service.

It held that the departmental findings were supported by evidence, the enquiry complied with natural justice and applicable procedure, and the punishment did not warrant judicial interference.

The writ petition was dismissed as meritless, and the impugned punishment, appellate, and mercy orders were left undisturbed.