High Courts may quash non-compoundable matrimonial proceedings upon a genuine, voluntary settlement.

Petitioner no. 1 and respondent no. 2 married on 11 December 2019 and began living separately in August 2020.

Following respondent no. 2’s complaint alleging dowry-related harassment, FIR No. 1098/2021 was registered against petitioner no. 1 and his family members under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 IPC.

The parties later executed an MoU dated 25 March 2026, under which petitioner no. 1 agreed to pay respondent no. 2 ₹1,00,000; the full amount had been paid by the date of the hearing.

Respondent no. 2 stated that she had settled the dispute and did not wish to pursue the proceedings.

The parties had no child, and their marriage had been dissolved by mutual-consent decree dated 29 July 2026.

The petition sought quashing of the FIR and proceedings arising from it on the basis of the settlement.

Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 IPC on the basis of the parties’ settlement.

Whether the parties’ settlement, in the circumstances of this matrimonial dispute, justified quashing notwithstanding the non-compoundable nature of the offences.

Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, corresponding to Section 482 CrPC, preserves the High Court’s inherent power to quash criminal proceedings, including in respect of non-compoundable offences, where the parties have genuinely settled their dispute and quashing does not adversely affect an overriding public interest.

In Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi, (2013) 4 SCC 58, the Supreme Court held that proceedings arising from matrimonial disputes may be quashed to give effect to a genuine, voluntary settlement, and that Section 320 CrPC does not bar the exercise of that power.

The Court also relied on Rangappa Javoor v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1736, which recognized that continuation of prosecution may serve no useful purpose where parties to a matrimonial dispute have amicably settled.

The Court found that the parties had resolved their dispute through the MoU, that the agreed settlement amount had been paid in full, and that respondent no. 2 freely stated she did not wish to continue the proceedings.

The marriage had also been dissolved by mutual consent, and no child was born of the marriage.

In light of these circumstances, the matrimonial nature of the dispute, and the State’s lack of objection, the Court concluded that the settlement warranted exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to secure the ends of justice.

The petition and pending application were disposed of accordingly.