High Courts should not entertain SARFAESI writ petitions where an effective statutory remedy exists.

The petitioner, Vinod Das, had obtained a loan of ₹12,00,000 from Hinduja Housing Finance Limited and claimed to have regularly paid 55 instalments amounting to ₹10,85,095 between February 2021 and September 2025.

He alleged that, despite such payments and his willingness to settle the outstanding dues, the lender initiated proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (“SARFAESI Act”) and issued a demand notice dated 13 December 2025 under Section 13(2).

The petitioner approached the Patna High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking, inter alia, quashing or staying of the Section 13(2) notice, consideration of his representation, and directions for settlement or fixation of instalments.

The respondent-Bank objected to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had an effective statutory alternative remedy under the SARFAESI Act.

Whether the writ petition under Article 226 was maintainable when the petitioner had an effective alternative remedy under the SARFAESI Act against the recovery proceedings and demand notice

Whether the petitioner was entitled to directions restraining SARFAESI proceedings, quashing the Section 13(2) notice, or requiring the lender to consider his representation and proposed settlement

Whether the petitioner could seek relevant loan documents from the respondent-Bank before pursuing the appropriate statutory remedy

The Court applied the settled principle that the High Court ordinarily should not entertain a petition under Article 226 when an effective alternative statutory remedy is available, particularly in matters concerning recovery of public dues and bank or financial-institution dues.

Relying on United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110, the Court held that statutory recovery enactments constitute a comprehensive code and that aggrieved persons should ordinarily exhaust the remedies provided under the relevant statute.

The Court further relied on Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) (P) Ltd., (2024) 2 SCC 1, and PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank, 2024 INSC 297, reiterating that writ jurisdiction should not ordinarily be invoked where an effective remedy is available under the SARFAESI Act.

The petitioner’s challenge directly concerned the lender’s SARFAESI measures, including the Section 13(2) demand notice and the alleged non-consideration of his representation.

Since the SARFAESI Act provides an effective statutory mechanism for challenging measures taken by a secured creditor, the Court held that the petitioner could not bypass that remedy merely by asserting that he had made substantial payments or was willing to settle the account.

Applying the principles in Satyawati Tondon, Celir LLP, and PHR Invent Educational Society, the Court declined to examine the merits of the petitioner’s objections in writ jurisdiction.

It nevertheless preserved the petitioner’s right to approach the appropriate forum and directed that the question of limitation be considered by that forum.

The Court also recorded the Bank’s submission that relevant documents would be supplied within 15 days if the petitioner submitted an application seeking them.

The petition was accordingly disposed of, without granting the requested stay, quashing of the Section 13(2) notice, or directions for settlement.

The petitioner was granted liberty to approach the appropriate statutory forum, which was directed to consider the issue of limitation.

The Bank stated that it would provide the requested relevant documents within 15 days of receiving the petitioner’s application.