Higher-start pay under G.O.Ms.No.321 depends on appointment before 1 April 2013, not prior selection.

The respondents were appointed as Junior Assistants by the concerned District Educational Officer through proceedings dated 25 April 2013.

They sought the benefit of G.O.Ms.No.321, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 2 July 1998, which granted a higher starting pay at two stages above the minimum scale to Graduate Junior Assistants, Typists and Record Clerks possessing a degree qualification at the time of appointment.

Subsequently, G.O.Ms.No.241, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 22 July 2013, discontinued the higher-start-of-pay benefit with effect from 1 April 2013.

The learned Single Judge allowed the respondents’ writ petition, W.P.No.14920 of 2020, by order dated 21 December 2024.

The State preferred the present intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

Whether the respondents, whose appointment orders were issued on 25 April 2013, were entitled to the higher starting pay under G.O.Ms.No.321 dated 2 July 1998 despite the cut-off date of 1 April 2013 prescribed by G.O.Ms.No.241 dated 22 July 2013?

Whether prior selection before 1 April 2013, followed by appointment after that date, conferred a right to claim the higher starting pay?

Whether the extension of the benefit to certain other similarly placed individuals could establish a precedent or create an enforceable right in favour of the respondents?

The Court applied G.O.Ms.No.321, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 2 July 1998, under which Graduate Junior Assistants, Typists and Record Clerks possessing the requisite degree qualification at the time of appointment were entitled to a higher starting pay at two stages above the minimum of the applicable pay scale.

It further applied G.O.Ms.No.241, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 22 July 2013, which discontinued the higher-start-of-pay benefit with effect from 1 April 2013, while protecting cases in which the benefit had already been granted between 1 April 2013 and the date of the Government Order from recovery.

The Court reaffirmed the principle that mere selection does not confer a right to Government service or service-related benefits; the relevant right accrues only upon appointment.

It also applied the principle that an erroneous benefit granted in isolated cases cannot be relied upon to perpetuate the same error.

The respondents’ appointment orders were issued on 25 April 2013, after the operative cut-off date of 1 April 2013 prescribed by G.O.Ms.No.241.

Since G.O.Ms.No.321 regulated pay fixation for persons appointed to Government service, the Court held that eligibility had to be determined by the date of appointment, not by the date of selection.

The respondents’ contention that their selection occurred before the cut-off date and that administrative delay caused the later appointment was rejected because selection, by itself, neither constituted entry into Government service nor created a vested right to pay fixation.

The Court also declined to treat the benefit allegedly granted to two other individuals as a binding precedent, observing that an erroneous or exceptional extension of a benefit cannot justify its continued grant contrary to the governing policy.

As the respondents were appointed on 25 April 2013, they were ineligible for the benefit.

The order dated 21 December 2024 in W.P.No.14920 of 2020 was set aside, the writ appeal was allowed, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed without costs.