### Holding of Oral Inquiry Is Mandatory for Major Penalty Even if Not Requested by Delinquent

The petitioner, appointed as a Lekhpal in 1980, was subjected to disciplinary proceedings in 2008-2009 based on three charges: (i) theft/destruction of revenue records (tearing an order from a file), (ii) possessing disproportionate assets, and (iii) submitting a false report regarding the conversion of village land.

While a criminal FIR regarding the records was stayed by the High Court, a departmental inquiry proceeded.

The Inquiry Officer (IO) submitted a report on 31.10.2009 finding the charges proved/partially proved despite not fixing a date for oral evidence or hearing.

Based on this, the Disciplinary Authority terminated the petitioner's services on 17.12.2009.

An appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the District Magistrate on 30.04.2010.

The court primarily applied Rule 7 of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, which outlines the procedure for imposing major penalties, including the requirement to mention witnesses and provide an opportunity for cross-examination.

It relied on the precedent of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, establishing that departmental proceedings are quasi-judicial and findings must be based on legally admissible evidence rather than conjectures.

Crucially, it applied the Division Bench ruling in Kaptan Singh v. State of U.P., which held that even if a delinquent does not expressly demand a personal hearing, the IO is not absolved from fixing a date for an oral inquiry; such a requirement is implicit in Rule 7 and protected by Articles 14 and 311 of the Constitution of India.

The Court observed that while Rule 7 of the 1999 Rules might appear silent on the necessity of an oral hearing when no witnesses are proposed by either side, judicial interpretation has made such a hearing mandatory.

In this case, the record confirmed that after the petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet, the IO proceeded to record findings without fixing a date, time, or venue for an oral inquiry and without providing the petitioner an opportunity to explain his conduct in person.

The Court reasoned that since the IO failed to afford this "sine qua non" opportunity for a reasonable defense, the inquiry report was legally fragile.

Consequently, the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities erred by blindly relying on a vitiated inquiry report without independent application of mind.

The writ petition was allowed, and the orders dated 17.12.2009 (termination) and 30.04.2010 (appellate dismissal) were set aside.

Although the court usually remits such matters for fresh inquiry, it declined to do so here because the petitioner had already reached the age of superannuation on 09.01.2018, rendering further disciplinary action "no fruitful purpose".