01Facts
These connected writ petitions arose from recovery proceedings in which personal guarantors to corporate debtors relied on interim moratoria under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), following applications under Sections 94 or 95.
¶ 1–3, 67–76, 78–90, 103–117Secured creditors challenged orders of the Debts Recovery Tribunals (DRTs), or sought directions to continue recovery and possession proceedings.
¶ 1–3, 67–76, 78–90, 103–117The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026, effective from 26 May 2026, inserted Section 96(4), excluding personal guarantors to corporate debtors from the protection of Section 96.
¶ 1–3, 67–76, 78–90, 103–117The petitions raised the question whether that amendment applied to applications already pending on its commencement.
¶ 1–3, 67–76, 78–90, 103–11702Issues
i.1. Whether Section 96(4) of the IBC, effective from 26 May 2026, applies to applications under Sections 94 or 95 that were pending on that date, so that the interim moratorium ceases to operate in those proceedings
¶ 1, 17, 64ii.2. Whether the interim moratorium under Section 96 gives a debtor a vested right that prevents the amendment from applying to pending proceedings
¶ 25, 29–3303Law Applied
Section 96(4) of the IBC provides that Section 96 does not apply where an application is filed to initiate an insolvency resolution process in respect of a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor.
¶ 34Sections 94–100 establish the application, report and admission or rejection process; the Court treated the process before adjudication under Section 100 as procedural, distinguishing it from the moratorium under Section 101 that follows admission.
¶ 29–32Applying Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma and SEBI v. Rajkumar Nagpal, the Court distinguished retrospective operation from retroactive operation: a law may operate prospectively from its commencement yet apply to pending transactions or proceedings.
¶ 20–22It also relied on BCCI v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. for the principle that a procedural amendment that removes a restriction, without impairing a vested right, may apply to pending proceedings.
¶ 28, 33The Court applied the mischief rule, as approved in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, to interpret the amendment in a manner that advances its remedial purpose.
¶ 46–47Provisions in the judgment · 46 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. 36 provisions
Section 14Section 18Section 23Section 31Section 66Section 68Section 94Section 95Section 96Section 97Section 98Section 99Section 100Section 101Section 102Section 103Section 104Section 105Section 106Section 107Section 108Section 109Section 110Section 111Section 112Section 113Section 114Section 115Section 116Section 117Section 118Section 119Section 120Section 121Section 124Section 179Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Section 12Section 26Section 34Section 36
General Clauses Act, 1897 Section 6
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 Section 6
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 Section 13Section 14
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 21Section 41
04Reasoning
The Court held that the interim moratorium under Section 96 operates during the procedural stage in which the resolution professional examines the application and prepares a report; it is temporary and does not confer an absolute or vested right to immunity from creditors’ proceedings.
¶ 31–35The amendment therefore removed a procedural restriction on creditors rather than taking away a vested right.
¶ 31–35The Court also considered the Select Committee’s findings that personal guarantors had misused the interim moratorium to obstruct recovery, and concluded that limiting the amendment to future applications would leave that identified problem unaddressed in pending cases.
¶ 36–49It rejected the argument that the words “is filed” restricted Section 96(4) to future applications, finding that the provision, read in context, included applications pending on the commencement date.
¶ 53–57Accordingly, the amendment operates from 26 May 2026 but applies to proceedings pending on that date.
¶ 61–6405Holding
The Court answered the principal question by holding that Section 96(4) applies retroactively to applications under Sections 94 or 95 pending on 26 May 2026; interim moratoria in respect of personal guarantors to corporate debtors ceased to operate from that date.
¶ 64It allowed the connected petitions: in Asset Reconstruction Co. India Ltd. v. Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries Pvt. Ltd., it permitted the DRAT and DRT proceedings to continue and directed the DRAT to dispose of specified appeals by 31 October 2026; in Indian Bank v. Shabbir Abbas Patel, it quashed the DRT’s restraining orders and directed that recovery and possession steps proceed, with the securitisation application to be decided expeditiously; in Godrej Finance Ltd. v. Ashok Rajkumar Gupta, it set aside the DRT’s restoration-of-possession order and directed the respondents to return possession within four weeks; and in the three Apna Sahakari Bank petitions, it quashed the DRT’s restraining orders.
¶ 70, 77, 102, 111It also allowed both RBL Bank petitions and directed the Court Commissioners, with police assistance, to take physical possession of the secured assets.
¶ 117–119Original Court PDF
Rbl Bank LtdvsState Of Maharashtra Through Senior Inspector Of Police
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