Identically situated Jail Superintendents must receive the revised pay scale granted to their juniors.

The petitioner, a retired Jail Superintendent appointed in 1990, claimed that from 1 January 1996 he was entitled to the revised pay scale of Rs. 8,000–13,500, rather than Rs. 6,500–10,500, under the Fitment Committee resolution dated 12 January 2004.

He relied on the ruling in *CWJC No. 22597 of 2012*, which had granted the higher scale to similarly situated Jail Superintendents, and on the subsequent affirmance of that ruling in an LPA and dismissal of the State’s SLP. He also claimed consequential ACP/MACP benefits. The State objected that his claim had been brought belatedly and sought time to provide the relevant factual and legal position

1. Whether the petitioner was entitled to the revised pay scale of Rs. 8,000–13,500 from 1 January 1996, in light of the Fitment Committee resolution and the prior decision concerning similarly situated Jail Superintendents.

2. Whether the petitioner’s claim should be determined by reference to the benefits granted to the persons with whom he sought parity, notwithstanding the State’s objection of delay.

The Fitment Committee resolution dated 12 January 2004, as described in the prior decision, replaced the pre-1996 pay scale of Rs. 2,200–4,000 for Superintendent, District Jail with Rs. 8,000–13,500 from 1 January 1996; the separate scale of Rs. 6,500–10,500 applied to Sub-Jail Superintendents and was not the replacement scale for persons already holding the District Jail Superintendent post before that date.

That interpretation was adopted in *CWJC No. 22597 of 2012* and affirmed in LPA No. 4 of 2015, with the State’s SLP subsequently dismissed. The Court also referred to Clause 4(c) of the Bihar Litigation Policy, 2011, which it described as supporting implementation of a settled judicial decision for similarly situated persons.

The Court noted that the entitlement of Jail Superintendents to the revised scale had already been addressed in the earlier litigation and affirmed on appeal.

However, because the petitioner’s individual claim and the State’s delay objection required consideration of the relevant record, the Court did not itself finally determine his entitlement. It directed the petitioner to submit a representation and required the competent authority to assess whether his case was identical to those of the persons whose benefits he invoked, particularly Respondent Nos. 13–16 in the earlier writ petition.

The petitioner was directed to file a fresh representation before the Secretary, Home Department, preferably within two weeks. The authority must decide it by a reasoned and speaking order; if the petitioner is found similarly situated to the identified beneficiaries, the same benefits must be granted within a further eight weeks.