In disciplinary proceedings, the right to cross-examination is not absolute and depends on specific case circumstances.

The Petitioner, a member of the Institute of Company Secretaries of India (ICSI), faced disciplinary proceedings initiated by Respondent No. 1.

During the proceedings, the Petitioner filed applications dated 27.12.2019 and 15.01.2020 before the Disciplinary Committee (Respondent No. 3), seeking to summon and cross-examine all witnesses whose statements were being relied upon by the complainant, and to strike off records of unexamined persons.

The Committee rejected these applications on 09.01.2020 and 06.10.2020, opining that the requests were intended to delay proceedings and noting the Petitioner’s failure to justify the need for cross-examination.

Subsequently, on 07.04.2021, the Committee found the Petitioner guilty of the charges.

The Petitioner challenged these orders via writ petitions, alleging a violation of the principles of natural justice.

Whether the Petitioner has an absolute right to cross-examine witnesses in disciplinary proceedings under the Company Secretaries (Procedure of Investigations of Professional and Other Misconduct and Conduct of Cases) Rules, 2007.

Whether the writ petitions are maintainable given the availability of an alternative statutory remedy under the Company Secretaries Act, 1980.

The court primarily applied Rule 18(14) of the Company Secretaries Rules, 2007, which grants the Disciplinary Committee discretion to refuse summoning witnesses if the request is made to delay proceedings.

It relied on the principle from *State of J&K v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad* [1966 SCC OnLine SC 70], establishing that the right to cross-examination is not an absolute rule of natural justice and depends on the circumstances of the case.

The court further referenced *Talluri Srinivas v. ICAI* to reiterate that no absolute right of cross-examination exists in departmental trials.

Finally, Sections 21B and 22E of the Company Secretaries Act, 1980 were applied regarding the statutory requirement for a hearing before penalty and the right to appeal to the Appellate Authority.

The Court reasoned that in disciplinary matters, natural justice does not mandate a universal right to cross-examine every deponent.

Applying this to the facts, the Court observed that the Petitioner was given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses provided he bore the costs, which he refused.

Furthermore, the Petitioner was permitted to file documentary evidence and written submissions to rebut the complainant's allegations.

The Court found that Respondent No. 3 acted within its discretion under Rule 18(14) after concluding the Petitioner’s requests were dilatory.

Since the Petitioner participated by filing documents, the Court held that the proceedings were not vitiated.

Regarding maintainability, the Court noted that the proceedings had only reached the stage of a finding of guilt; since Section 22E provides a consolidated right of appeal against the final order of penalty, a "piecemeal adjudication" via writ jurisdiction was unjustified.

The Court further held that the petitions were premature because the Petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 22E of the Company Secretaries Act, 1980, once a final order on penalty is passed.

Consequently, both writ petitions were disposed of, granting the Petitioner liberty to raise all objections before the Appellate Authority at the appropriate stage.