Facts
The appellant, Mohd. Ayub, challenged his conviction under Section 302 of the IPC and a sentence of life imprisonment passed on October 18, 2004
Source reference: p. 1-2On March 28, 2000, the deceased (Madhu) was admitted to Safdarjung Hospital with 90% burns
Source reference: p. 2The prosecution alleged that the appellant, who was in a relationship with the deceased, poured kerosene oil on her and pushed her onto a burning stove following an altercation
Source reference: p. 3The prosecution relied on two primary dying declarations: one recorded in the Medico-Legal Certificate (MLC) by PW-13 and a second statement recorded by the Investigating Officer (PW-15)
Source reference: p. 2-3However, all purported eyewitnesses, including the deceased’s children (PW-5 and PW-6) and a neighbor (PW-2), turned hostile
Source reference: p. 7, 13The appellant pleaded that he was at a factory and arrived only to save the deceased, sustaining burn injuries in the process
Source reference: p. 4-5Issues
1. Whether the dying declarations made by the deceased were voluntary, truthful, and consistent enough to form the sole basis of conviction
Source reference: p. 13-182. Whether the circumstantial evidence established a complete chain of events pointing exclusively to the guilt of the appellant
Source reference: p. 5, 23Law Applied
Section 302 of the IPC regarding murder
Source reference: p. 2Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act concerning the admissibility of dying declarations
Source reference: p. 17It relied on Irfan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) and Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar (2026) to establish that while a dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction, it must inspire full confidence and be free from tutoring or inconsistencies
Source reference: p. 13-18The court further applied the "complete chain" test for circumstantial evidence as per Narendrasinh Keshubhai Zala v. State of Gujarat
Source reference: p. 23Reasoning
The court found the dying declarations unreliable due to material contradictions and procedural infirmities.
Source reference: no citationThe MLC (Ex.PW-13/A) used terms like "new lover," which the court viewed as the doctor’s personal observation rather than the deceased's words
Source reference: p. 19PW-13 admitted the mention of "kerosene" was based on smell, not the patient's statement
Source reference: p. 20The second declaration (Ex.PW-15/C) contained unusually precise details about the appellant’s parentage and address, which the court deemed improbable for a victim with 90% burns
Source reference: p. 20Crucially, the "Brief Facts" (Ex-PW-15/DA) recorded by the police presented a conflicting third version suggesting a scuffle where the deceased fell accidentally
Source reference: p. 21The court noted that the appellant's own burn injuries (Ex.PW-14/A) supported his defense of attempting to save her
Source reference: p. 7, 22Furthermore, the lack of a fitness certificate from a doctor at the time of the police statement and the non-involvement of an SDM further weakened the prosecution's case
Source reference: p. 20, 24Holding
The High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt as the dying declarations did not inspire confidence and the circumstantial evidence was incomplete
The court set aside the judgment dated October 16, 2004, and the sentencing order dated October 18, 2004
Source reference: p. 25The appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC, and his personal bonds and sureties were discharged
Source reference: p. 25Original Court PDF
Mohd.AyubvsState
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