Inconsistent, family-influenced dying declarations cannot establish cruelty or abetment of suicide beyond reasonable doubt.

Nirmalaben, married to respondent No. 3 Kishorbhai for approximately four years, died after pouring kerosene on herself and setting herself ablaze on 22 June 2011.

The prosecution alleged that her parents-in-law—respondent Nos. 1 and 2—had subjected her to taunts, verbal abuse, and physical and mental harassment, including compelling her to perform labour work.

A complaint was subsequently lodged alleging offences under Sections 498A, 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”).

The prosecution examined 17 witnesses and produced 15 documentary exhibits.

The complainant, the deceased’s father, brother, and another witness did not support the prosecution case at trial.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Gondal, acquitted all the accused in Sessions Case No. 69 of 2011 by judgment dated 15 June 2012.

The State preferred the present appeal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents subjected the deceased to cruelty punishable under Section 498A IPC?

Whether the deceased’s suicide was abetted by the respondents so as to attract Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC?

Whether the police statement and dying declaration were sufficiently voluntary, consistent, reliable, and trustworthy to sustain a conviction?

Whether the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, had adequate grounds to interfere with the trial court’s judgment?

The Court applied Sections 498A, 306, 107 and 114 of the IPC, holding that cruelty and abetment of suicide must be established through credible evidence and that mere harassment or the fact that a woman committed suicide within seven years of marriage is insufficient by itself to prove abetment.

Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 permits, but does not compel, a presumption of abetment where a married woman commits suicide within seven years of marriage and was subjected to cruelty; the statutory conditions must first be established.

The Court relied on Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618, and Ram Pyare v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 6 SCC 820, regarding the requirements for establishing abetment of suicide.

It relied on Irfan alias Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2023 SC 4129, for the principles governing the reliability of dying declarations, including voluntariness, absence of tutoring or prompting, consistency, and the rule of first opportunity.

In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, but the accused benefit from a double presumption of innocence; where two reasonable views are possible, the acquittal should not be disturbed, as stated in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, and reaffirmed in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169.

The Court found that the principal prosecution witnesses, including the deceased’s mother, father, and brother, did not support the prosecution case.

The two principal statements of the deceased were also viewed with suspicion because family members were present when they were recorded, and the deceased’s brother identified her thumb impressions.

Moreover, the police statement implicated only the parents-in-law, whereas the later dying declaration added the husband, creating an inconsistency concerning the persons allegedly responsible.

The Investigating Officer admitted that the husband’s name was subsequently added in the dying declaration and that the statements of neighbouring witnesses did not substantiate the allegations; those witnesses were not examined at trial.

The alleged conduct—quarrels regarding household work and clothing—did not, in the Court’s view, establish legally sufficient cruelty or a proximate act of instigation, provocation, or incitement under Sections 498A, 306 and 107 IPC.

Since the prosecution failed to establish cruelty as a foundational fact, no adverse presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act could assist it merely because the suicide occurred within seven years of marriage.

Applying the heightened restraint applicable to an appeal against acquittal, the Court held that the trial court’s view was reasonable and neither perverse nor legally infirm.

It held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had subjected the deceased to cruelty or abetted her suicide, and that the disputed statements and dying declaration did not inspire sufficient confidence to support conviction.

The State’s appeal was therefore dismissed, the judgment of acquittal dated 15 June 2012 was confirmed, the respondents’ bail bonds were cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial court.