Inconsistent testimony of sole eyewitness and unnatural conduct of witnesses entitle the accused to benefit of doubt.

The prosecution alleged that on February 22, 1995, the appellants, armed with various weapons, entered the house of Kisto Mehra (P.W.-5) to kill him.

When P.W.-5 fled, Nundeo Mehra allegedly assaulted Santu Mehra (the deceased) with a *bhujali*, causing his death, while other appellants stood guard or committed theft.

The Trial Court convicted Nundeo Mehra under Section 302 IPC (Life Imprisonment) and Naresh, Shankar, and Jai Kant Mehra under Section 148 IPC (2 years RI).

Several other original appellants died during the pendency of the appeal, leading to abatement against them.

The appellants challenged the conviction on grounds of prior enmity, lack of independent corroboration, and the unreliable testimony of the sole eyewitness, P.W.-6.

1. Whether the testimony of the informant (P.W.-6), as a sole eyewitness, was sufficiently reliable and trustworthy to sustain a conviction.

2. Whether the prosecution established the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt given the alleged material contradictions and the unnatural conduct of the witnesses.

The court applied Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which stipulates that no particular number of witnesses is required to prove a fact.

It relied on *Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B.* and *Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra* to affirm that while conviction can be based on a solitary witness, the quality of evidence must be "wholly reliable" and "inspire confidence".

Regarding the "benefit of doubt," the court cited *Rang Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P.* and *Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra*, establishing that if two views are possible, the one favorable to the accused must be adopted.

It further noted that defense witnesses (D.W.) deserve equal weightage to prosecution witnesses per *Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar*.

The High Court found significant discrepancies between the informant’s (P.W.-6) testimony and the physical evidence.

While P.W.-6 claimed to witness the murder from her courtyard, the Investigating Officer (P.W.-7) and the Inquest Report [Ext.-3] established that the deceased lived in a separate house and his body was found at an exit not visible from the informant's purported position.

The court noted a material contradiction: P.W.-6 initially stated the deceased was dragged out by the accused but later testified he came out on his own.

Furthermore, the conduct of P.W.-5 (husband) was deemed "unrealistic" and "unnatural"; despite claims of hiding in a tree, defense and hostile witnesses testified he arrived later in a wet condition after taking a bath, which is inconsistent with a person fleeing for his life.

The failure to seize/exhibit the earthen lamp used for identification further weakened the prosecution's case.

It ruled that the Trial Court erred in treating the informant’s testimony as "wholly reliable" despite the geographical impossibilities of the site and the witnesses' suspicious conduct.

Consequently, the High Court set aside the judgment of conviction dated July 28, 1998, and the order of sentence dated July 29, 1998.

The appellants were acquitted of all charges and discharged from their bail bonds.