Industrial Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce statutory prohibition against strikes during pending conciliation proceedings.

The petitioner, a company manufacturing automotive electronics, faced a charter of demands and a strike notice dated 23.02.2026 from the respondent-Union (R2), scheduled to commence on 09.03.2026

Following a representation by the petitioner, conciliation proceedings commenced before the Addl. Labour Commissioner on 03.03.2026

Despite the pendency of these proceedings, the Union intended to proceed with the strike. The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking to quash the strike notice and restrain the Union, arguing that the strike violated Section 62(1)(d) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020

1. Whether an industrial establishment, during the pendency of conciliation proceedings, can maintain a writ petition to restrain a strike by the workers’ Union on the ground that the proposed strike is prohibited under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020

2. Whether an aggrieved party can approach the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, challenging the legality of a proposed strike when conciliation proceedings are still pending

Section 62(1)(d) and Section 63 of the Industrial Relations Code (IRC), 2020, which prohibit strikes during conciliation and deem such strikes illegal

Section 97 of the IRC to establish the bar on Civil Court jurisdiction

Sections 44(1) and 44(7)(c) regarding the Industrial Tribunal's jurisdiction to decide the "illegality or otherwise of a strike"

The "function test" for Article 226 maintainability against private bodies as established in S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd.

Section 104(1A) of the IRC regarding existing Labour Courts/Tribunals as a transitional provision

The court determined that R2-Union is not "State" under Article 12, nor does it perform a public duty, making a writ of certiorari or mandamus generally unavailable against it

Although the IRC 2020 mandates conciliation, the court noted an "unintended vacuum" where Section 53(6) seemingly restricts Tribunal access until a failure report is issued

Through a purposive and harmonious construction, the court reasoned that Section 44(7)(c) and Section 62 provide the Tribunal with specialized jurisdiction to enforce statutory prohibitions even while conciliation is pending

It held that the Tribunal has limited jurisdiction to grant interim protection specifically to uphold Section 62(1)(d) without adjudicating the underlying industrial dispute

Finally, the court clarified that under Section 104(1A), existing Tribunals under the 1947 Act can exercise these powers until new Tribunals are constituted under the Code

It held that (a) a writ against a Union to restrain a strike is generally not maintainable unless exceptional circumstances exist; and (b) an aggrieved party has a statutory remedy to approach the Industrial Tribunal for limited relief to enforce the prohibition under Section 62 of the IRC 2020 during pending conciliation

The petitioner was granted liberty to approach the competent Tribunal, and the period during which the High Court’s interim stay was in operation was excluded from the statutory timeframe for the strike