Inherent jurisdiction cannot restore a petition absent sufficient cause and diligent explanation of delay.

The petitioners had filed CRL.M.C. No. 1682/2011 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking quashing of the summoning order dated 15 November 2010 in a complaint under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

The High Court issued notice, stayed the trial-court proceedings on 23 May 2011, admitted the petition on 27 September 2013, and made the interim stay absolute.

After the matter was listed on 5 August 2014, it was taken up on 11 July 2022, when neither party appeared and the petition was dismissed for non-prosecution.

The petitioners filed an application on 21 October 2024 seeking recall and restoration, accompanied by an application for condonation of 919 days’ delay.

They attributed the delay and non-appearance to the matter having remained unlisted for several years and to the lapse of their erstwhile counsel.

The respondent opposed the applications, contending that the petitioners had failed to show sufficient cause or bona fide diligence and had continued to pursue connected proceedings between the parties.

1. Whether the High Court should condone the petitioners’ delay of 919 days in filing the restoration application by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.

2. Whether the order dated 11 July 2022 dismissing CRL.M.C. No. 1682/2011 for non-prosecution should be recalled and the petition restored.

3. Whether the petitioners’ explanation that the matter had remained unlisted for several years and that the default was attributable to their erstwhile counsel constituted sufficient cause.

The Court applied Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, corresponding to Section 482 Cr.P.C., recognising that the High Court may, in an appropriate case, recall an order dismissing a criminal petition for non-prosecution; however, restoration is discretionary and requires sufficient cause, reasonable diligence, and bona fide conduct.

Relying on Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, AIR 2010 SC 3043, the Court held that liberal construction of “sufficient cause” remains subject to reasonable time and proper conduct, and that unexplained negligence or inaction should not ordinarily deprive the opposite party of accrued rights.

The Court also relied on Shazeb v. State of NCT of Delhi, CRL.M.C. 4741/2017, where prolonged apathy and an unexplained delay of 913 days justified refusal of restoration.

Further, Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, read with G. Ramegowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142, establishes that delay may be condoned to advance substantial justice where no gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or lack of bona fides is attributable to the applicant, but there is no general principle excusing every mistake of counsel.

The Court held that the petitioners’ explanation was neither satisfactory nor sufficient.

The fact that the matter remained dormant or unlisted for approximately eight years did not relieve them of their duty to monitor litigation instituted by them, particularly because they were a corporate litigant engaged in several connected proceedings with the respondent.

Their obligation was heightened because they had obtained and continued to benefit from an interim stay that kept the criminal proceedings pending for over a decade; they should therefore have periodically checked the case status or sought its early listing.

The Court rejected the attempt to shift complete responsibility onto the erstwhile counsel, observing that the petitioners could not disclaim responsibility for a proceeding whose pendency continued to provide them protection from the trial proceedings.

The substantial or arguable merits of the original quashing petition were held irrelevant at the restoration stage, since merits could be considered only after the petition was restored.

Applying the principles governing sufficient cause and bona fide diligence, the Court found prolonged neglect and an unsubstantiated explanation for both the non-appearance and the 919-day delay.

It held that they had failed to establish sufficient cause for condoning the 919-day delay and consequently dismissed CRL.M.A. No. 1333/2025.

As a result, the application seeking recall of the order dated 11 July 2022 and restoration of CRL.M.C. No. 1682/2011, CRL.M.A. No. 1332/2025, was also dismissed.

Any pending applications were dismissed, and a copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to the Trial Court for information and necessary compliance.