Under Section 11A, tribunals cannot reappreciate evidence where a fair inquiry yields a plausible finding.

The respondent-workman, Dharam Singh, a Chainman employed at TISCO’s Bhelatand Colliery, was charge-sheeted for allegedly threatening R.C. Singh, Assistant Colliery Manager, with a revolver at the Sijua Colliery pit-top during the night of 18–19 June 1994.

The workman denied the charge and pleaded alibi, claiming that he was undergoing medical treatment at a private nursing home.

A domestic enquiry was conducted in which R.C. Singh, Security Officer Ajay Kumar, and N.K. Gupta were examined; the Enquiry Officer also considered the hospital records and rejected the workman’s alibi.

The charge was held proved and the workman was dismissed with effect from 1 November 1994.

The Industrial Tribunal initially held the enquiry fair and proper, but subsequently, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, re-appreciated the evidence, set aside the enquiry findings and dismissal, and directed reinstatement with 25% back wages.

The management challenged the Award under Article 226 of the Constitution.

During the writ proceedings, the workman attained superannuation on 29 October 2018.

Whether the Industrial Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by re-appreciating evidence and substituting its own findings for those recorded in a fair and proper domestic enquiry.

Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the charges were not proved because the management had not examined all independent witnesses, lodged an FIR, or produced a written complaint.

Whether the dismissal imposed for threatening a superior officer with a revolver was disproportionate to the proved misconduct.

Whether the impugned Award suffered from perversity, jurisdictional error, or violation of natural justice warranting interference under Article 226.

The Court applied Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, under which an Industrial Tribunal may examine the justification and proportionality of dismissal but cannot ordinarily act as an appellate body when a fair domestic enquiry has resulted in a plausible finding based on evidence.

Relying principally on Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC 813, and Amrit Vanaspati Co. Ltd. v. Khem Chand, (2006) 6 SCC 325, the Court held that interference is permissible where the enquiry finding is perverse, or where victimisation, unfair labour practice, or mala fides are established.

The standard in a domestic enquiry is preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt, as explained in Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh v. Management of Usha Breco Ltd., (2008) 5 SCC 554, and Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam, (2005) 3 SCC 241.

Strict rules of the Evidence Act do not apply; logically probative material and credible hearsay may be considered, as held in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491, and Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. A.T. Mane, (2005) 3 SCC 254.

Judicial review does not permit re-appreciation of evidence under Article 226, as reiterated in CISF v. Abrar Ali, (2017) 4 SCC 507.

Interference with punishment under Section 11A requires circumstances such as shockingly disproportionate punishment, mitigating factors, or relevant past conduct, consistent with M.P. Electricity Board v. Jagdish Chandra Sharma, (2005) 3 SCC 401, and V. Ramana v. A.P. SRTC, (2005) 7 SCC 338.

The Court found that the domestic enquiry had already been held fair and proper and that the Enquiry Officer’s conclusion was supported by relevant evidence: the complainant, R.C. Singh, directly supported the allegation; N.K. Gupta corroborated the workman’s presence with a pistol; Ajay Kumar confirmed the immediate report of the incident; and the Enquiry Officer considered and rejected the workman’s medical alibi with reference to the hospital evidence.

The Tribunal nevertheless re-weighed the testimony, drew adverse inferences from the absence of an FIR and written complaint, insisted upon examination of additional independent witnesses, inferred an allegedly revengeful motive on the part of R.C. Singh, and applied the criminal-law standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

These conclusions were held perverse because the charge-sheet disclosed the alleged occurrence and the complainant had been examined and cross-examined; there was no legal requirement for an FIR, written complaint, or examination of every possible witness in a domestic enquiry.

The Tribunal’s finding that the Enquiry Officer violated natural justice was also impermissible, particularly since the enquiry had earlier been declared fair and proper and the Enquiry Officer had considered both the management evidence and the alibi.

Since the domestic finding was based on legally acceptable evidence and was not shown to be perverse, the Tribunal had exceeded the limits of Section 11A by acting as an appellate forum.

Threatening a superior officer with a revolver at the workplace was considered grave misconduct, and dismissal was not shockingly disproportionate.

It held that the Industrial Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 11A by re-appreciating evidence, applying the standard of proof applicable to criminal trials, and setting aside a plausible finding recorded in a fair domestic enquiry.

The finding of misconduct and the punishment of dismissal were upheld, as the alleged threat with a revolver constituted serious workplace misconduct and the punishment was not disproportionate.

Accordingly, the Award dated 20 June 2005 directing reinstatement with 25% back wages was quashed and set aside, and the writ petition was allowed.

The pending interlocutory application was disposed of with the observation that admissible payments under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act had been made until the workman’s retirement.