Injunction cannot be granted where the claimant fails to prove title or possession over vacant land.

The appellant-plaintiff claimed ownership of a 100-square-yard plot in Khasra No. 100, Wazirabad, on the basis of a registered GPA, Agreement to Sell, receipt and connected documents, and sought permanent and mandatory injunctions against obstruction to construction and forcible dispossession.

The respondent-defendant denied the plaintiff’s ownership and possession and asserted his own possession and title over the property.

The plaintiff had earlier instituted Suit No. 147/2005, which was dismissed with liberty to file a fresh suit after complying with procedural requirements; the appeal against that order remained pending.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove her title or possession, particularly as the complete chain of title had not been produced and the electricity bill did not identify the suit plot.

The First Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal and rejected the plaintiff’s application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC for additional evidence.

The plaintiff consequently filed the present second appeal under Section 100 CPC.

Whether the courts below erred in dismissing the injunction suit for non-exhibition and non-production of the plaintiff’s title documents, despite the plaintiff’s assertion that copies were part of the record.

Whether the First Appellate Court wrongly refused to admit additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC despite the alleged illness and subsequent death of the plaintiff’s former counsel and the availability of the documents in connected proceedings.

Whether the findings of the courts below were perverse for disregarding the electricity bill and alleged chain-of-title documents, and whether any substantial question of law arose under Section 100 CPC.

Whether the plaintiff was entitled to permanent and mandatory injunctions when she had failed to establish either her title or possession over the vacant suit property.

The Court applied Section 100 CPC, under which a second appeal lies only where a substantial question of law arises.

It considered Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, which permits additional evidence at the appellate stage only when the statutory conditions are satisfied and not merely to fill evidentiary gaps or lacunae.

Relying on Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead), 2008 (SC) 2033, the Court reiterated that in the case of a vacant site not physically possessed by either claimant, possession follows title; the person who establishes the better title is treated as being in possession against one who fails to prove title.

A party seeking injunction based on proprietary rights must establish the relevant title and possession through admissible evidence.

The Court held that the plaintiff’s challenge rested primarily on the alleged inability of her former counsel to produce the originals of the Agreement to Sell and other title documents.

However, the Trial Court had also relied on the plaintiff’s own categorical statement that she did not wish to exhibit the documents, and not merely on the absence of originals.

Further, the plaintiff had failed to produce the complete chain of title preceding the documents allegedly executed in her favour by Aman Kumar; those documents alone could not establish her proprietary claim.

The application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC could not cure this fundamental evidentiary deficiency, since additional evidence could not be admitted merely on oral assertions or to fill lacunae.

The electricity bill was also insufficient to prove possession because it did not identify the plot number or otherwise establish that it related to the suit property.

Applying the principle that possession of a vacant site follows title, the Court found that the plaintiff had proved neither title nor possession and therefore could not obtain injunctions.

Since the findings were based on the evidence and no legal error or perversity was demonstrated, no substantial question of law arose.

The second appeal was dismissed, and the pending applications were disposed of accordingly.