Inordinate delay and credibility disputes do not warrant quashing when they require trial.

The petitioner sought to quash FIR No. 71/2021, registered under Sections 376 and 506 IPC, and the resulting criminal proceedings.

The FIR alleged that the petitioner, then using the name “Sanjay Kothari,” raped the complainant in December 2004; it was lodged in March 2021, after she allegedly identified him through Facebook in April 2019.

The petitioner argued that the delay, inconsistencies in the complainant’s accounts, and official RTI responses showing no record of her earlier complaints demonstrated retaliation and false implication.

A prior petition challenging the charge-sheet and alleging that the investigating officer had disregarded exculpatory documents was dismissed in 2022.

The petitioner subsequently brought this writ petition seeking quashment of the FIR, charge-sheet, charge-framing order, and proceedings.

The court expressly left challenges to the order authorising further investigation and the supplementary charge-sheet to a connected petition.

Whether the FIR and criminal proceedings should be quashed because of the delay exceeding 16 years and the petitioner’s claim that the prosecution was a retaliatory counterblast.

Whether the alleged contradictions in the complainant’s statements and the official RTI responses constituted undisputed, unimpeachable material warranting interference at the threshold.

Under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (analogous to Section 482 CrPC), the High Court may quash criminal proceedings sparingly to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice; it ordinarily must not conduct a mini-trial or decide disputed questions of fact.

The categories in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, include proceedings that disclose no offence, are inherently improbable, or are manifestly mala fide, but the power must be exercised with circumspection and not to assess the genuineness or reliability of allegations.

Applying State of Himachal Pradesh v. Prem Singh, AIR 2009 SC 1010, the court noted that delay in reporting sexual assault cannot be treated like delay in other offences and, by itself, does not justify rejecting a prosecution at the threshold.

The complainant’s explanation was that the petitioner had concealed his identity and that she discovered his actual identity only in 2019. The court held that the truth or falsity of this explanation required testing at trial and that the delay alone did not warrant quashing.

It similarly treated the conflicting accounts about the date and circumstances of the incident, and the dispute over whether earlier complaints had been submitted or destroyed during routine record-weeding, as factual matters requiring evidence rather than determination on competing affidavits.

The court also declined to revisit the petitioner’s complaint about the investigation, as that grievance had already been raised and decided in the earlier petition.

It therefore found no basis under Bhajan Lal to interfere with the prosecution at this stage.

The trial court was directed to proceed in accordance with law, uninfluenced by the observations in the judgment.

The legality of the further-investigation order and supplementary charge-sheet was left open for determination in the connected petition.