Inordinate delay and the non-retrospective operation of the 1999 Act bar rehabilitation land claims.

The Petitioners are the legal heirs of Navji Krushna Vanghare, whose lands (Survey Nos. 134 and 130/6 at village Dehane, Pune) were acquired for the Chaskaman Irrigation Project.

The acquisition awards were passed on March 31, 1989, and the original landowner accepted the compensation without protest.

No application for rehabilitation or alternate land was made for over 33 years.

The Petitioners filed the current Writ Petition on September 21, 2022, seeking directions to the Respondents to issue a notice under Section 16(2)(a) of the Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act, 1999 (“1999 Act”) and to allot alternate land in the project's beneficial zone.

1. Whether the Petitioners are entitled to rehabilitation and land allotment after an inordinate delay of 33 years from the date of the land acquisition award?

2. Whether the provisions of the Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act, 1999, specifically Section 16(2)(a), have retrospective application to acquisitions completed in 1989?

The Court primarily applied the doctrine of "delay and laches" as established by the Supreme Court in Government of India & Ors. v. P. Venkatesh (2019) 15 SCC 613, which precludes relief for causes of action raised after inordinate delays.

It further relied on the principle that the Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act, 1999 does not have retrospective effect.

The Court also compared the 1999 Act with the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976, noting that the 1976 Act contained no provision akin to Section 16(2)(a) of the 1999 Act.

Several coordinate bench precedents, including Nana Narayan Bhalerao v. District Resettlement Officer & Ors (2023) and Dnyanu Bhiku Tanpure v. Deputy Collector (2023), were cited to affirm the dismissal of similar claims based on delay.

The Court reasoned that the Petitioners' claim was fundamentally barred by time, as the cause of action arose in 1989 upon the passing of the awards, yet the Petition was only filed in 2022.

The original landowner had accepted compensation without protest and failed to apply for rehabilitation during his lifetime.

The Court rejected the Petitioners' contention that no limitation period applies to such claims, citing consistent jurisprudence from coordinate benches that dismissed similar petitions on the grounds of delay and laches.

Furthermore, the Court determined that the 1999 Act, under which the Petitioners sought a notice, could not be applied to the 1989 acquisition because the statute lacks retrospective effect and its predecessor (the 1976 Act) lacked the specific statutory right (Section 16(2)(a)) claimed by the Petitioners.

The Court affirmed that the 1999 Act cannot be applied retrospectively to acquisitions concluded under earlier regimes where no similar statutory right to notice existed.

No relief or directions for land allotment were granted.