Inordinate delay bars a challenge to termination unrelated to the employee’s conviction.

The appellant was appointed as a Vidya Sahayak in 1999. After an FIR was registered against him and family members, he was convicted in 2003.

That year, the authorities issued him a show-cause notice concerning unauthorised absence. He explained that he had been in police custody; the authorities concluded that he had nevertheless signed the attendance register and terminated his services on 2 January 2004. The termination order was based on absenteeism, not the conviction.

The appellant’s criminal appeal resulted in his acquittal on 1 August 2025.

He then filed a writ petition challenging the termination, which the Single Judge dismissed for delay. He appealed that dismissal.

The Court accepted that an employee may be terminated on the basis of a conviction without a departmental inquiry, as contemplated by Rule 11.

A challenge to an order of termination should be brought without undue delay, particularly where the asserted illegality is apparent from the order itself.

The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that challenging the termination before his acquittal would have been futile because Rule 11 permitted termination without an inquiry following conviction.

The termination order did not rely on the conviction; it relied on approximately 42 days of absenteeism. Accordingly, the conviction did not explain why the appellant had not challenged the termination earlier.

Given the substantial delay—described by the Court as 22 years—the Single Judge was justified in refusing relief.

Finding no reason to interfere with the Single Judge’s decision, it dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal.