Inordinate delay cannot be condoned absent a cogent and credible sufficient-cause explanation.

The applicant, General Manager, O.N.G.C., filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of a delay of 718 days in preferring a First Appeal.

The applicant attributed the delay principally to the time consumed in obtaining proper certified copies and to procedural lapses in the copying process, contending that the delay was bona fide and procedural in nature.

The State and the private respondents opposed the application, arguing that no sufficient cause had been pleaded or established and that the explanation contained in paragraphs 2 to 8 of the application was inadequate.

The Court found that the reasons pleaded did not satisfactorily explain the entire delay and were unsupported by documentary evidence.

Whether the applicant had established “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to condone the inordinate delay of 718 days in filing the First Appeal.

Whether, upon condonation of the delay, the First Appeal could be registered.

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which an appeal may be admitted after expiry of the prescribed period only when the applicant satisfies the Court that sufficient cause prevented timely filing.

Although “sufficient cause” may receive a liberal construction to advance substantial justice, such liberal approach is conditional upon the absence of negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides; limitation principles cannot be displaced merely by invoking substantial justice or a justice-oriented approach.

The Court also held that the accrued rights of the opposing party should not be defeated routinely by condoning delay.

Relying on State of Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High Schools, 2026 INSC 148, the Court reiterated that condonation of delay is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right; a mere excuse, including bureaucratic indifference or procedural delay, is insufficient without a credible explanation.

The Court held that the applicant’s explanation regarding certified copies and procedural lapses did not account for the entire 718-day delay and did not demonstrate that the stated circumstances actually prevented filing the appeal within the limitation period.

The asserted reasons were considered inadequate, and the pleadings were not supported by documentary evidence.

Applying the requirement of due diligence under Section 5 and the Supreme Court’s distinction between a genuine “explanation” and a mere “excuse,” the Court concluded that the applicant had failed to establish sufficient cause or bona fides warranting exercise of discretionary relief.

The condonation application was accordingly dismissed, and the consequential prayer for registration of the First Appeal was rejected.

Any connected civil applications were also disposed of as having become infructuous.