### Inordinate delay cannot be condoned where the applicant fails to establish a bona fide sufficient cause.

The applicant sought restoration of Second Appeal No. 836/2002, which had been dismissed on June 30, 2014, for non-compliance with a common conditional order.

There was an inordinate delay of 3677 days in filing the restoration application.

The applicant claimed he had no knowledge of the 2014 dismissal because his counsel did not intimate him and his father (who managed the litigation) died in 2013.

The respondents opposed the application, noting that the applicant had filed for revenue map corrections in 2022 without mentioning the pending appeal and asserting that the applicant was never in possession of the suit property, contrary to his claims.

1. Whether the applicant established "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a delay of 3677 days in filing the restoration application.

2. Whether the negligence or lack of communication by counsel and the death of a family member constitute valid grounds for condoning over ten years of delay.

The court primarily applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act regarding the condonation of delay, which requires the applicant to establish "sufficient cause" preventing timely filing.

It relied on the precedent *State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary* (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612), which established that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and that substantial justice must not prejudice the opposite party.

The court further applied the principle from *Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat* (AIR 1981 SC 733), holding that "sufficient cause" must be traced to circumstances arising within the prescribed limitation period, not events occurring after the period has already expired.

The Court found that the applicant failed to provide satisfactory material to prove he was prevented by circumstances beyond his control from filing the application for over a decade.

It noted that the grounds urged—specifically the lack of communication from the counsel and the hand-over of litigation from the father—demonstrated a clear lack of due diligence and negligence rather than a bona fide obstacle.

Applying the *Ramkumar Choudhary* precedent, the Court reasoned that allowing such a massive delay (3677 days) would cause undue prejudice to the respondents who had already secured a decree in the lower courts.

The Court observed that the applicant was a party to the original proceedings and could not shift total responsibility to his deceased father to justify ten years of inaction.

The Court dismissed I.A. No. 16822/2024 (the application for condonation of delay) and consequently dismissed the MCC (restoration application) as barred by limitation.