Inordinate delay cannot be condoned where the applicant fails to establish due diligence or sufficient cause.

The applicants filed a Second Appeal (No. 1216/2012) which was dismissed on 31.10.2013 due to non-compliance with a peremptory order.

Twelve years later, the applicants filed the present Misc. Civil Case (M.C.C.) seeking restoration of the appeal, accompanied by I.A. No. 1470/2026, an application to condone a delay of 4,405 days.

The applicants contended they were unaware of the dismissal because their counsel failed to inform them.

1. Whether the applicants established "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone an inordinate delay of 4,405 days in filing the restoration application.

The court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which requires an applicant to establish "sufficient cause" that prevented them from approaching the court within the prescribed period.

It relied heavily on the precedent *State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary* (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612), which incorporates principles from *Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy*.

These precedents establish that: (a) delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity; (b) the length of delay is a relevant factor; (c) the court must first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation before looking at the merits; and (d) sufficient cause must be traced to circumstances arising within the original limitation period.

The court found that the applicants failed to provide any satisfactory material or plausible explanation to justify the 4,405-day delay.

Applying the *Ramkumar Choudhary* standard, the court observed that the applicants demonstrated negligence and a lack of due diligence rather than circumstances beyond their control.

The court emphasized the Supreme Court's mandate that the "Sword of Damocles" should not hang over a respondent indefinitely due to an appellant's inaction.

Since the applicants could not prove they were reasonably diligent during the limitation period, the test for condonation remained unsatisfied.

Consequently, I.A. No. 1470/2026 was dismissed, and the M.C.C. was dismissed as being barred by limitation.