Inordinate delay cannot be condoned without substantiating sufficient cause and demonstrating due diligence.

The appellant/plaintiff sought to challenge the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2016 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Sakti, in Civil Suit No. 20A/2015

The appellant filed the First Appeal under Section 96 of the CPC with a delay of 3398 days (9 years, 6 months, and 20 days)

In an application for condonation of delay (I.A. No. 2 of 2026) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the appellant claimed he was unaware of the 2016 judgment because he had migrated to Jammu and Kashmir with his family for livelihood and only returned to his village in January 2026

Whether the appellant’s migration for livelihood constituted "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone an inordinate delay of 3398 days

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which mandates that an appellant must show "sufficient cause" for failing to prefer an appeal within the limitation period

Basawaraj v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (2013), which held that "sufficient cause" implies an adequate reason that prevents a party from approaching the court and excludes cases of negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides

Pathpati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (2024), stating that while Section 5 is construed liberally, it cannot be used to defeat the law of limitation where there is inordinate delay or want of due diligence

The court observed that the appellant failed to produce any material evidence to substantiate the claim that he was residing in Jammu and Kashmir during the decade-long delay

The explanation provided was deemed "vague" and insufficient to meet the legal standard of "sufficient cause"

The court reasoned that while the law of limitation can be harsh, the court lacks the power to ignore statutory provisions on purely equitable grounds, especially when a party has acted negligently or remained inactive for an extended period

The court emphasized that the discretion to condone delay cannot be exercised as a matter of routine for a delay exceeding nine years without a cogent and satisfactory explanation

I.A. No. 2 of 2026 for condonation of delay was rejected, and the First Appeal was consequently dismissed as time-barred