Inordinate delay caused by gross negligence cannot be condoned merely by imposing costs.

The trial court passed a judgment and decree against the petitioners on 10 July 2019.

The petitioners stated that they learned of it in February 2020, but applied for certified copies only in September 2022 and filed a regular civil appeal that month, 712 days late.

They attributed the delay in part to the COVID-19 situation.

The appellate court’s order dated 13 October 2025 refused to condone the delay.

In a separate order dated 17 July 2025, the appellate court had recorded that respondent No. 1.3 had died and that the appeal stood abated against him.

Whether the petitioners established sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the 712-day delay in filing their appeal.

Whether the appeal had abated against all respondents because a deceased respondent and the other respondents had a common interest in the subject matter.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act permits a court to condone delay where sufficient cause is established, but the discretion must be exercised judiciously; negligence, inaction, want of bona fides, or lack of due diligence may justify refusing condonation.

The Court relied on Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash for the principle that a litigant must remain vigilant and cannot ordinarily shift responsibility for delay entirely to counsel.

The Court relied on K.B. Lal v. Gyanendra Pratap and Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy for the principles governing a liberal but reasoned approach to “sufficient cause”.

The Court relied on Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA) for the propositions that limitation serves public policy and that a liberal approach cannot defeat limitation law.

The Court relied on Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer for the rule that delay cannot be condoned where the party was negligent, inactive, or lacked bona fides.

The Court considered the petition under its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.

The petitioners knew of the decree by February 2020 but did not seek certified copies until September 2022.

The Court found that the COVID-19 circumstances did not adequately explain this period: the petitioners could have applied for copies when they learned of the decree, and time remained after the first phase of the pandemic for them to pursue the appeal.

Applying the cited principles, the Court characterized the delay as gross negligence and a lackadaisical approach, and held that imposing costs would not cure the absence of sufficient cause.

It also noted that the deceased respondent and the other respondents were legal heirs and representatives with a common interest in the suit, and concluded that the appeal had abated against all respondents.

It further held that the appeal had abated against all respondents.

The petition was dismissed in limine, with no order as to costs.