Inordinate delay serves as no ground for condonation absent proof of "sufficient cause" within the limitation period.

The applicant, an employee of the Border Security Force (BSF), filed a criminal revision petition challenging a maintenance order dated 18.06.2024.

The revision was filed with a significant delay of 532 days beyond the statutory period of limitation.

The applicant sought condonation of this delay via I.A. No. 01 of 2026, contending that his posting in Manipur and the difficulty in obtaining leave from the BSF authorities constituted a bona fide reason for his inability to approach the court in time.

1. Whether a delay of 532 days in filing a criminal revision petition can be condoned on the grounds of professional exigencies and posting in a remote area.

2. Whether the reasons provided by the applicant constitute "sufficient cause" under the law of limitation.

The court primarily applied the limitation principles under the Limitation Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (2024 INSC 932), which emphasizes that "sufficient cause" requires an adequate reason that prevented the party from approaching the court within the limitation period.

It further relied on Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi (2021) and Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram (2023) to establish that limitation must be applied with rigor and that negligence or inaction precludes condonation.

Additionally, the court cited Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat (1981) for the principle that "sufficient cause" must be traced to circumstances arising within the original period of limitation, not after its expiry.

The High Court scrutinized the applicant’s justification, noting that while the applicant claimed his BSF posting in Manipur prevented him from filing the revision, he failed to demonstrate a specific "sufficient cause" that rendered him incapable of acting during the initial 90-day limitation window.

Following the Ramkumar Choudhary precedent, the court observed that the discretion to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and not as a matter of "generosity," especially when such delay prejudices the opposite party’s rights.

The court found that the applicant’s explanation did not meet the legal threshold of diligence; rather, it reflected a "callous and lackadaisical attitude".

The court reasoned that since the doctrine of limitation is rooted in public policy to ensure finality in litigation, an inordinate delay of 532 days without a compelling legal justification cannot be overlooked.

Consequently, the criminal revision petition was dismissed as being hopelessly barred by limitation and laches.

The Court affirmed that events arising after the expiry of the limitation period cannot retrospectively justify the failure to file within the prescribed time.