Inquiry Officer acting as prosecutor by cross-examining witnesses vitiates departmental proceedings for bias.

The petitioner, appointed as a Constable in the CRPF on 22.02.2006, was suspended on 12.06.2015 following allegations of unauthorized absence from camp, alcohol consumption during duty, and misbehavior with seniors.

A departmental inquiry was initiated via charge-sheet dated 24.07.2015. Although a Presenting Officer was appointed, the Inquiry Officer personally cross-examined eight prosecution witnesses.

On 02.12.2015, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order dismissing the petitioner from service. The petitioner challenged this dismissal under Article 226, contending the Inquiry Officer acted with bias and the final order was non-speaking.

1. Whether the act of an Inquiry Officer cross-examining prosecution witnesses, despite the presence of a Presenting Officer, violates the principles of natural justice and renders the inquiry biased.

2. Whether the impugned dismissal order is legally sustainable as a "speaking order" containing justifiable reasons.

The court applied the fundamental principle of natural justice that "no man shall be a judge in his own cause," specifically the facet that an adjudicator must not act as a prosecutor.

Union of India v. Mohd. Naseem Siddiqui [ILR (2004) MP 821] and Union of India v. Ram Lakhan Sharma [(2018) 7 SCC 670], which establish that if an Inquiry Officer conducts examination-in-chief or cross-examination to establish the employer's case, they lose the capacity of an independent adjudicator.

State of Punjab v. Bandip Singh [(2016) 1 SCC 724] and Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan [(2010) 9 SCC 496], mandating that quasi-judicial orders must be "speaking orders" impregnated with reasons.

The Court observed that the records (specifically pages 36, 39, 46, and 49 of the petition) clearly demonstrated that the Inquiry Officer had elaborately cross-examined the witnesses.

By doing so, the Inquiry Officer abandoned his neutral role as a "Judge" and assumed the role of a "Prosecutor," which vitiated the inquiry due to presumed bias.

The Disciplinary Authority failed to independently evaluate the facts or address the grounds raised in the petitioner's reply, thereby failing to exercise its quasi-judicial discretion in a rational manner.

The Court allowed the petition and quashed the impugned dismissal order dated 02.12.2015. The respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith with all consequential benefits, including seniority and notional increments, though backwages were denied based on the principle of "no work, no pay".