01Facts
The Petitioner entered into an Agreement for Sale (dated 26.03.2019) and subsequent Supplemental Agreements with the Respondents regarding commercial units in Gurugram
pp. 2-3On 27.04.2026, the Petitioner served a Section 9 notice under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, upon the Respondents seeking to protect his rights
¶ 2On 28.04.2026, the Respondents issued a letter terminating the allotment, citing "force majeure" and commercial frustration
¶ 2, 12, 21On 30.04.2026, the Respondents purportedly allotted the same units to a third party (M/s Amrit Skyline Builders) for nominal token amounts
¶ 9-10, 18The Petitioner moved the High Court seeking interim stay on the termination and a restraint on the creation of third-party rights
p. 202Issues
i.1. Whether the court can grant interim protection under Section 9 of the Act to stay a termination letter and preserve the status quo of immovable property
¶ 16-17ii.2. Whether the Respondents’ invocation of "force majeure" for events dating back to 2020 justifies termination in 2026 after subsequent affirming conduct
¶ 21-22iii.3. Whether the purported third-party allotments were bona fide commercial transactions or sham proceedings intended to frustrate the Petitioner's rights
¶ 10, 18, 2403Law Applied
The court primarily applied Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, regarding interim measures
pp. 1-2It relied on Rahul Bhargava v. Neo Developers (P) Ltd., establishing that in real estate disputes, preservation of property is central to ensuring final adjudication remains effective
¶ 7The court noted the 2018 amendment to Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which emphasizes the enforcement of contractual rights in immovable property
¶ 6, 8Regarding the non-enforceability of terminated contracts, the court distinguished JLT Energy SAS v. Hindustan Cleanenergy Ltd. and Bharat Catering Corpn. v. IRCTC, holding that there is no "straitjacket" rule barring protective relief if the termination appears prima facie retaliatory or contrary to agreed contractual procedures
¶ 11-16Provisions in the judgment · 6 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Section 9Section 11Section 12Section 17Section 21
Specific Relief Act, 1963 Section 10
04Reasoning
The court found the timing of the termination (one day after the Section 9 notice) to be prima facie retaliatory and intended to defeat the Petitioner’s rights
¶ 17It observed that the Respondents failed to comply with the mandatory notice and 90-day cure period stipulated under Clauses 7.10.1 and 7.10.2 of the Agreement
¶ 19-20The "force majeure" plea was rejected at the prima facie stage because the Respondents had executed Supplemental Agreements and transfer certificates as recently as 2024 and 2025, long after the COVID-19 events cited
¶ 21-22Furthermore, the court viewed the third-party allotments with suspicion, noting that units worth crores were purportedly transferred for only nominal token amounts immediately following the termination
¶ 10, 18, 24Consequently, the court determined that the balance of convenience favored the Petitioner to prevent irreparable prejudice
¶ 2305Holding
The court stayed the impugned termination letter and directed that consequential third-party allotments shall not be given effect
¶ 24The court appointed Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajesh Bindal (Retd.) as the Sole Arbitrator to resolve the disputes
¶ 31The Section 9 petition was ordered to be treated as an application under Section 17 before the learned Arbitrator. The petition was disposed of with all rights and contentions left open for the merits of the arbitration
¶ 36, 35-39Original Court PDF
Mr. Pradeep DassvsSplendor Landbase Limited & Ors.
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