Facts
The petitioners, including Motiraj Sewa Trust and Cambrian Public School, challenged an eviction order and damage assessment dated June 23, 2021.
Source reference: p. 2The order was passed by the Estate Officer of the Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (HEC) under Section 5-A(2) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, following a determination that the petitioners were unauthorized occupants.
Source reference: p. 2The petitioners sought a writ of certiorari to quash the eviction proceedings and a writ of mandamus to compel HEC to enter into a long-term lease.
Source reference: p. 2-3Issues
1. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable when a statutory remedy of appeal is available under the relevant Act
Source reference: p. 4, para. 52. Whether the High Court, upon declining to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, can grant interim protection to the petitioners to facilitate the filing of an appeal
Source reference: p. 4, para. 9Law Applied
The Court applied Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, which provides a statutory remedy of appeal against orders passed under Section 5-A.
Source reference: p. 4, para. 4It relied on the principle of "efficacious alternative remedy," which generally precludes writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when a specific statutory forum exists.
Source reference: p. 4, para. 5Regarding interim relief, the Court applied the doctrine established in Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, Purandhar & Ors. (2026 SCC OnLine SC 297), which holds that once a court declines to entertain a petition due to an alternative remedy, it is impermissible to grant interim relief or status quo orders.
Source reference: p. 4-5, para. 9.1Reasoning
The Court observed that the impugned order was checkmated by Section 9 of the Act of 1971, which mandates an appeal to a specialized Appellate Authority capable of reviewing both facts and law.
Source reference: p. 4, para. 4-5Since the petitioners bypassed this statutory route, the Court held that exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 was unwarranted.
Source reference: p. 4, para. 5Following the Supreme Court’s recent precedent in Mangal Rajendra Kamthe, the Court reasoned that once it loses jurisdiction by referring the party to an alternative forum, it cannot passing "interim-gap" orders as such actions would contradict the decision in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta.
Source reference: p. 5, para. 9.1Holding
The High Court declined to entertain the writ petition and directed the petitioners to file a statutory appeal before the competent Appellate Authority.
The Court held that no interim relief could be granted after the dismissal of the writ on grounds of alternative remedy.
Source reference: p. 4, para. 9The Court directed the Appellate Authority to consider any application for condonation of delay under Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act "sympathetically," in light of the time spent pursuing the writ petition.
Source reference: p. 4, para. 7The writ petition and all pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.
Source reference: p. 5, para. 10-11Original Court PDF
MOTIRAJ SEWA TRUST THROUGH ITS SECRETARY SRI PARMA SINGHvsTHE UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF HEAVY INDUSTRY
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