Jharkhand High Court

Interim Relief Cannot Be Granted Once Writ Jurisdiction Is Declined Due To An Efficacious Alternative Remedy

MOTIRAJ SEWA TRUST THROUGH ITS SECRETARY SRI PARMA SINGH vs THE UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF HEAVY INDUSTRY

Jharkhand High CourtJUDGMENT: May 13, 20262 MIN READSOURCE JUDGMENT
THE ORIGINAL LAWLENS SUMMARY
01

Facts

The petitioners, including Motiraj Sewa Trust and Cambrian Public School, challenged an eviction order and damage assessment dated June 23, 2021.

Source reference: p. 2

The order was passed by the Estate Officer of the Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (HEC) under Section 5-A(2) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, following a determination that the petitioners were unauthorized occupants.

Source reference: p. 2

The petitioners sought a writ of certiorari to quash the eviction proceedings and a writ of mandamus to compel HEC to enter into a long-term lease.

Source reference: p. 2-3
02

Issues

1. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable when a statutory remedy of appeal is available under the relevant Act

Source reference: p. 4, para. 5

2. Whether the High Court, upon declining to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, can grant interim protection to the petitioners to facilitate the filing of an appeal

Source reference: p. 4, para. 9
03

Law Applied

The Court applied Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, which provides a statutory remedy of appeal against orders passed under Section 5-A.

Source reference: p. 4, para. 4

It relied on the principle of "efficacious alternative remedy," which generally precludes writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when a specific statutory forum exists.

Source reference: p. 4, para. 5

Regarding interim relief, the Court applied the doctrine established in Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, Purandhar & Ors. (2026 SCC OnLine SC 297), which holds that once a court declines to entertain a petition due to an alternative remedy, it is impermissible to grant interim relief or status quo orders.

Source reference: p. 4-5, para. 9.1
04

Reasoning

The Court observed that the impugned order was checkmated by Section 9 of the Act of 1971, which mandates an appeal to a specialized Appellate Authority capable of reviewing both facts and law.

Source reference: p. 4, para. 4-5

Since the petitioners bypassed this statutory route, the Court held that exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 was unwarranted.

Source reference: p. 4, para. 5

Following the Supreme Court’s recent precedent in Mangal Rajendra Kamthe, the Court reasoned that once it loses jurisdiction by referring the party to an alternative forum, it cannot passing "interim-gap" orders as such actions would contradict the decision in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta.

Source reference: p. 5, para. 9.1
05

Holding

The High Court declined to entertain the writ petition and directed the petitioners to file a statutory appeal before the competent Appellate Authority.

The Court held that no interim relief could be granted after the dismissal of the writ on grounds of alternative remedy.

Source reference: p. 4, para. 9

The Court directed the Appellate Authority to consider any application for condonation of delay under Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act "sympathetically," in light of the time spent pursuing the writ petition.

Source reference: p. 4, para. 7

The writ petition and all pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.

Source reference: p. 5, para. 10-11
Jharkhand High Court

Original Court PDF

MOTIRAJ SEWA TRUST THROUGH ITS SECRETARY SRI PARMA SINGHvsTHE UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF HEAVY INDUSTRY

Jharkhand High Court · May 13, 2026

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