Interim Relief Cannot Be Granted Once Writ Jurisdiction Is Declined Due To An Efficacious Alternative Remedy

The petitioners, including Motiraj Sewa Trust and Cambrian Public School, challenged an eviction order and damage assessment dated June 23, 2021.

The order was passed by the Estate Officer of the Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (HEC) under Section 5-A(2) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, following a determination that the petitioners were unauthorized occupants.

The petitioners sought a writ of certiorari to quash the eviction proceedings and a writ of mandamus to compel HEC to enter into a long-term lease.

The Court applied Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, which provides a statutory remedy of appeal against orders passed under Section 5-A.

It relied on the principle of "efficacious alternative remedy," which generally precludes writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when a specific statutory forum exists.

Regarding interim relief, the Court applied the doctrine established in Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, Purandhar & Ors. (2026 SCC OnLine SC 297), which holds that once a court declines to entertain a petition due to an alternative remedy, it is impermissible to grant interim relief or status quo orders.

The Court observed that the impugned order was checkmated by Section 9 of the Act of 1971, which mandates an appeal to a specialized Appellate Authority capable of reviewing both facts and law.

Since the petitioners bypassed this statutory route, the Court held that exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 was unwarranted.

Following the Supreme Court’s recent precedent in Mangal Rajendra Kamthe, the Court reasoned that once it loses jurisdiction by referring the party to an alternative forum, it cannot passing "interim-gap" orders as such actions would contradict the decision in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta.

The Court held that no interim relief could be granted after the dismissal of the writ on grounds of alternative remedy.

The Court directed the Appellate Authority to consider any application for condonation of delay under Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act "sympathetically," in light of the time spent pursuing the writ petition.

The writ petition and all pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.