Interlocutory order restraining statutory eviction proceedings constitutes an appealable 'Judgment' under Letters Patent.

The Delhi Race Club (Respondent) occupied 84.484 acres of land under a 1926 lease granted for a "Race Course." The lease expired on 31.12.1994

Following a history of litigation where a 1999 eviction notice was quashed in 2012 with liberty to the Union (Appellants) to decide on renewal representations, the Union eventually rejected the renewal due to defense and security needs

After a 2026 civil suit was disposed of with the observation that eviction must follow due process, the Estate Officer issued a fresh show cause notice dated 17.04.2026 under Sections 4(1) and 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (PP Act)

The Respondent challenged this notice via a writ petition. The learned Single Judge, via an interim order dated 24.04.2026, stayed the eviction proceedings citing the "chequered history" of the case

1. Whether the intra-court appeal is maintainable against an interlocutory order, and whether such an order qualifies as a "Judgment" under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent

2. Whether the Single Judge’s order deferring statutory eviction proceedings without assigning reasons or finding a prima facie case is legally sustainable

The court applied Clause 10 of the Letters Patent (Lahore) and Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, regarding the maintainability of appeals against a "Judgment"

It relied on Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, which established that "Judgment" includes interlocutory orders that possess "trappings of finality" and affect vital rights

The court applied Section 2(g) and Section 4 of the PP Act, interpreting "unauthorized occupation" as per Escorts Heart Institute v. DDA, which includes occupants whose initial authority has ceased

Finally, it applied the principles for interim relief under Article 226/Order XXXIX CPC as defined in Union of India v. Era Educational Trust and Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra, requiring a three-pronged test: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury

The Division Bench determined that the appeal was maintainable because the stay on the show cause notice directly impacted the Appellant's statutory right to reclaim public premises under Section 4 of the PP Act, thus qualifying as a "Judgment" under the Shah Babulal Khimji test

Analyzing the merits of the stay, the court found the Respondent was an "unauthorized occupant" under Section 2(g) of the PP Act as the lease had expired in 1994

The Bench held that the Single Judge erred by failing to record findings on the prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable loss. It noted that a "very strong prima facie case" is required to stay a statutory notice

The court rejected the Respondent's claim of "pre-meditated" action, noting that following the statutory procedure of the PP Act constitutes "due process of law" as previously directed by the civil court

It further held that the Single Judge’s order was unsustainable for lack of reasoning and failure to apply the legal standards for granting injunctions. The appeal was allowed, and the direction staying the Estate Officer from proceeding with the show cause notice dated 17.04.2026 was set aside