Internal Complaints Committee consisting of subordinates violates natural justice and creates a real likelihood of bias.

The Appellant, a Scientist at ICAR Tripura, filed a complaint on 05.12.2018 alleging sexual harassment by Respondent No. 7 (Joint Director).

An Institute Complaints Committee (ICC) was formed, but its members were subordinate in rank to the accused.

The ICC report (09.04.2019) characterized the dispute as a behavioral clash without specific findings on harassment.

The Appellant’s statutory appeal was dismissed by the Secretary, ICAR (Respondent No. 2) on 30.07.2021.

A Single Judge of the High Court subsequently dismissed her writ petition, holding that the ICC report was a mere "preliminary inquiry" and that the matter should have been raised before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT).

1. Whether a writ petition challenging an ICC report and the subsequent appellate order is maintainable, or if it constitutes a "service matter" within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal?

2. Whether the ICC report was vitiated due to the committee members being subordinate in rank to the respondent and the failure to provide the Appellant with cross-examination rights?

The Court applied Section 11 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (POSH) Act, 2013, which mandates inquiries be conducted in accordance with applicable service rules.

Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, stipulates that the Complaints Committee is a "deemed inquiring authority" and must follow the prescribed procedure for major penalties.

The Court relied on Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa (2024), which established that an ICC inquiry is not a mere "fact-finding" exercise but a formal inquiry that must adhere to natural justice.

Regarding bias, the Court applied the "real likelihood of bias" test from Badrinath v. Govt. of T.N. and Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., alongside DOPT O.M. dated 07.01.1971, which requires Inquiry Officers to be senior in rank to the delinquent officer.

The Court first resolved the jurisdictional issue, citing a previous inter-partes Division Bench judgment (WA No. 183/2021) which held that POSH complaints have repercussions (compensation, trauma, IPC registration) beyond simple "service matters," thus making writ jurisdiction appropriate.

On the merits, the Court found the ICC’s procedure fundamentally flawed. It rejected the "preliminary inquiry" defense, noting that under the POSH Act and CCS Rules, the ICC must act as the final Inquiring Authority; failing to allow cross-examination or supply witness depositions violated Rule 14 of the CCS Rules and natural justice.

Furthermore, the Court found a "real likelihood of bias" because all ICC members were subordinates of Respondent No. 7, who, as Joint Director, controlled their Annual Performance Appraisal Reports (APARs).

The failure to transfer the accused during the inquiry further allowed him to exercise a dominant and coercive influence over witnesses.

The Court held that an inquiry by junior officers against a senior cannot command confidence and violates the principle of "justice being seen to be done".

It directed Respondents 1-5 to constitute a new ICC comprising members senior to Respondent No. 7 within 4 weeks. This new committee must conduct a fresh inquiry under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, ensuring full evidence sharing and cross-examination, and conclude within six months.